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I. INTRODUCTION
"The supreme tragedy of life is the immolation of woman."' Judith
has been denied food, beaten, kicked and prostituted by her captor. He
has crushed glass in her face, extinguished cigarettes on her body and
poured boiling liquid over her. She has tried to escape several times only
to be found, dragged back to captivity and brutally beaten. Her captor
has threatened to maim and kill her, and her situation is worsening by the
day. Finally, she has the opportunity to take and conceal a gun. She waits
until her captor is caught off guard and shoots him in the back, ending
his reign of terror over her.
If this were a description of "the dehumanization process suffered by
prisoners of war under the Nazis during the Second World War" 2 or of
"the brainwashing techniques of the Korean War," 3 is there any doubt
that Judith would be considered justified in killing her captor? Would it
matter that she got the opportunity to kill him while he was sleeping?
Would anyone judging her actions express reservations about justifying
her actions because she did not wait until her captor awakened and re-
sumed his acts of terror over her? Would judging the reasonableness of
her act require a psychiatric examination to determine whether she had
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sor Meir Dan-Cohen, Professor George P. Fletcher, Professor R. Kent Greenawalt and Professor An-
drezej Rapaczynski for the valuable assistance they gave me during the preparation of this article. I
am also indebted to Professor Joachim Hruschka, Professor Jan C. Joerden and Gregory Silverman for
their moral and intellectual support. My thanks also go to members at the University of Texas-
Austin who very kindly invited me to discuss this paper as a part of their colloquium series.
** All English translations of German texts are by the author.
I. State v Wingler, 184 NC 747, 115 SE 59, 61 (1922), cited by Justice Martin in his dissenting
opinion in State v Norman, 324 NC 253, 378 SE2d 8, 21 (1989).
2. State v Norman, 324 NC 253, 378 SE2d 8, 17 (1989) (dissenting opinion by Judge Martin
citing psychiatric evaluation of treatment received by Judy Norman from her husband).
3. Id; see also State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461, 693 P2d 475 (1985).
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suffered from some syndrome caused by the inhumane treatment to
which she was subjected? Obviously not.
But the description above is not of a prisoner of war, it is the descrip-
tion of a prisoner of marriage, the narrative of a battered wife, Mrs. Judy
Norman, during the last thirty-six hours of her marriage. The saga of
Judy Norman does not end, however, with the death of her conjugal tor-
turer. When she was brought to account for this "crime of self-defense" 4
the North Carolina trial court refused to instruct the jury on the law
relevant to self-defense. 5 The North Carolina Court of Appeals granted
her a new trial, considering this refusal to be reversible error. 6 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and upheld the trial court's
omission,7 holding that the evidence failed to show that the defendant
could have reasonably believed that she faced an imminent threat of seri-
ous bodily harm or death.8 Thus the story of Mrs. Judy Norman ends like
so many stories similar to her own, with a housewife and mother serving
years of imprisonment to which she was sentenced for voluntary man-
slaughter of her loving husband.
Did the trial court err or did it reach the proper conclusion on a
highly charged and emotional issue? The purpose of this article is to con-
sider this question and explore the possibilities of justifying the battered
woman who kills her sleeping spouse. This particular task has been se-
lected because it represents a combination of extremes and thereby seems
to be the most difficult case to defend. On the one hand, justifying the
battered woman's lethal response is the most favorable treatment that a
court could give, because that would mean that the woman had a right to
kill her husband.9 On the other hand, affirming this right against a sleep-
4. George Fletcher describes the deeds of Bernhard Goetz in this way in A Crime of Self-Defense:
Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial (The Free Press, 1988).
5. Norman, 378 SE2d at 9 (cited in note 2).
6. State v Norman, 89 NC App 384, 366 SE2d 586 (1988).
7. Norman, 378 SE2d at 8 (cited in note 2).
8. Id at 15.
9. This article assumes that a difference exists between justifying and excusing conduct. If con-
duct is justified it is legally correct conduct; therefore, the actor has a right to engage in it, anyone can
rightfully assist him, and no one may rightfully prevent him from engaging in it. If conduct is excused
it is wrongful, but because of the particular circumstances or the actor's individual weaknesses it is
not punishable. Since it is wrongful no one may assist an excused actor, and anyone may prevent him
from carrying out his deed. This distinction has received considerable attention in the scholarly
literature, see George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law SS 10.1-10.5 at 759-875 (Little, Brown, 1978);
Paul Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses SS 24-25 at 83-101 (West, 1984), and Glanville Williams,
Textbook of Criminal Law (Stevens & Sons, 1978) and has also enjoyed some judicial discussion of an
academic nature, see State v Leidholm, 334 NW2d 811 (ND 1983). Its practical relevance for Anglo.
American law has been questioned, however, and the argument has been made that the rights of
third parties do not always correlate with whether an actor is justified or excused. See Kent Greena-
walt, The Perplexing Borders of Justyflcation and Excuse, 84 Colum L Rev 1897, 1918-27 (1984).
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ing spouse is the most difficult case that a court could confront, because
at the moment of the killing the victim is totally helpless. 10
Battering has become a serious and wide-spread problem in the
United States."I Attorneys have presented evidence of the "battered wo-
man syndrome" to mitigate the degree of the offense charged,12 to excuse
the defendant's conduct on the basis of insanity or diminished capacity, 13
and to justify acts undertaken in self-defense. 4 United States courts dis-
posed to justifying the battered woman's spousal killing have turned to
self-defense for the solution.'5 Although in some instances, unlike the
Norman case, higher courts have upheld this application of self-defense,' 6
its use raises certain theoretical problems inherent to the defense.' 7 Per-
haps for this reason many courts have been unwilling to adopt it.
Part II of this article will discuss the problems with applying the tradi-
tional defense of self-defense in battered woman cases. One of these
problems, which relates to a much broader range of criminal law cases, is
the objectivity or subjectivity appropriate for interpretation of the reason-
10. Although this article focuses on one extreme, it does not exclude other possible defenses.
Depending upon the facts of any particular case, the appropriate judgment could range from first
degree murder to justified homicide including all forms of mitigation and excuse as intermediate
solutions to the case under consideration.
11. See Murray Straus, Rirchard Gelles and Suzanne Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors: Violence in
the American Family (Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1980); Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome
(Springer, 1984); F. Lee Bailey and Henry Rothblatt, Crimes of Violence: Homicide and Assault (Law-
yers' Co-op, Supp 1990).
12. See Maria Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 Cal L Rev
1657, 1718-23 (1981); Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Hear of Passion Manslaughter and
Imperfect Self.Defense, 33 UCLA L Rev 1679 (1986).
13. See Marcus, 69 Cal L Rev at 1711-18 (cited in note 12).
14. State v Norris, 279 SE2d 570 (NC 1981); Leidholm, 334 NW2d 811 (cited in note 9); State v
Gallegos, 719 P2d 1268 (NM App 1986); State v Wanrow, 559 P2d 548 (Wash 1977); State v Crigler, 23
Wash App 716, 598 P2d 739 (1979).
15. See Ilm-Tamas v United States, 407 A2d 626 (DC 1979); People v Reeves, 47 I11 App 3d 406,
362 NE2d 9 (1977); State v Hodges, 239 Kan 63, 716 P2d 563 (1986); Hundley, 693 P2d 475 (cited in
note 3); State v Kelly, 97 NJ 178, 478 A2d 364 (1984); Gallegos, 719 P2d 1268 (cited in note 14);
Norman, 366 SE2d 586 (cited in note 6) (overruled, Norman, 378 NE2d 8 (cited in note 2)); State v
Norris, 279 SE2d 570 (cited in note 14); Leidholm, 334 NW2d 811 (cited in note 9); State v Allery, 101
Wash 2d 591, 682 P2d 312 (1984); Crigler, 598 P2d 739 (cited in note 14); Wanrow, 559 P2d 548
(cited in note 14).
16. See Leidholm, 334 NW2d 811 (cited in note 9); Wanrow, 559 P2d 548 (cited in note 14); but
see Moran v Ohio, 1983 WL 2712 (Ohio App) cert denied 469 US 948, 105 S Ct 350 (1984) Uustices
Brennan and Marshall dissenting) (no published prior history).
17. See Sunny Graff, Battered Women, Dead Husbands: A Comparative Study of Justiication and
Excuse in American and West German Law, 10 Loyola LA Intl & Comp LJ 1 (1988); Cathryn Rosen,
The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am
U L Rev 11 (1986); Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: The Killing of a Passive Victim-A Perfect Defense
or a Perfect Crime? State v Norman, 11 Camp L Rev 263 (1989) ("Note, The Killing of a Passive Victim");
Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 Stan L Rev
615 (1982); Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 Va
L Rev 619 (1986) ("Note, A Legal and Empirical Dissent").
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ableness standard. Part II also analyzes the reasonableness standard and
offers possible solutions to the problems inherent to the self-defense justi-
fication, some of which come from solutions offered to similar problems
within the German criminal legal system. Part I of this article examines
necessity as a justification and as an excuse as these defenses have devel-
oped in German case law and theoretical literature. Additionally, Part III
discusses some aspects of modern German theory regarding two different
forms of justified necessity, namely aggressive and defensive necessity, and
uses them to analyze cases also atypical for application of the self-defense
justification. Part IV of this article suggests that defensive necessity lends
itself particularly well conceptually as a justification for some of the bat-
tered woman cases. Part IV proposes model codifications for this defense
and the complementary aggressive necessity justification. Since the legal
concepts involved, however, are also inherent to the common law and
available to U.S. courts independent of any legislative changes, perhaps
they can offer a practical solution for courts as yet unwilling to justify the
battered woman's response as an act in self-defense.
H. UNITED STATES LAW
A. Self-Defense as an Objective and Subjective Issue
United States courts that give consideration to a justification for the
battered woman's spousal killing do so under the requirements of self-
defense. The traditional, objective elements of self-defense are (1) an im-
minent attack, (2) a threat of death or serious bodily injury, (3) the impos-
sibility of retreat and (4) a limitation to only that force necessary to ward
off the attack. 18 Objectively, all four of these requirements are problems
in the type of battered woman case under consideration. If the spouse is
sleeping at the time of the defensive action, then the imminence of the
attack requirement must include the threat of future harm. In battering
cases that requirement may be appropriate. Evidence of the battering re-
lationship usually gives ample reason to assume that the spouse's attack
will continue after he awakens. In addition, the woman most often is
physically inferior to her mate, so that waiting for the attack to resume
will mean sacrificing the possibility of defending herself. The Model Pe-
nal Code definition of self-defense is in fact more favorable than tradi-
tional self-defense provisions with regard to the imminence requirement,
since it provides that the force must be immediately necessary to protect
18. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 855-75 (cited in note 9); Wayne LaFave and Austin
Scott, Criminal Law 391-97 (West, 1972); Paul Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses 5 131(b)-(d) at 73-
88 (West, 1984).
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oneself on the present occasion. 19 This formulation is broader than one
requiring that the attack be imminent.
If the attack is not imminent, both the seriousness of the harm
threatened and the necessity of the defense employed are objectively inde-
terminable. In cases in which the woman kills her sleeping spouse, it is
impossible to know whether he would have posed a threat of death or
great bodily harm upon awakening. Deadly force self-defense, however,
presupposes an attack of this nature. Clearly, evidence of the victim's
past violence and the type of injuries he had caused his spouse indicate
the type of injuries he would most likely have inflicted had he awakened
and resumed the battering. But even in cases in which the defendant had
been disfigured in the past, courts have been reluctant to assume as an
objective matter that her spouse threatened great bodily harm on the par-
ticular occasion.20 Furthermore, since the confrontation never occurred,
one also cannot determine whether killing the victim was the necessary
defense. The amount of force necessary to repel an attack depends upon
the situation and the means available to the defendant at the time. Ob-
jectively, this determination is difficult to make in the absence of any real
attack. The woman's comparative physical weakness can be the basis of
an argument asserting that no means short of actually killing the batterer
would secure her physical integrity. But even if one were prepared to
relax both of these requirements in favor of the battered woman, their
relaxation within the confines of the self-defense justification would
stretch the defense far beyond its traditional scope.21
The retreat rule would also not seem to be satisfied in cases in which
the spouse was asleep at the time of the defensive action.2 2 In a society in
which divorce is an easily available alternative, the wife's presence seems
to be purely voluntary. Often the wife has been abused over a period of
19. Model Penal Code S 3.04(1) ("MPC"); see also MPC 5 3.04(1) (Comments Tent Draft
1958); Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses 5 131(c)(2) at 78-79 (cited in note 18).
20. Norman 378 SE2d at 15 (cited in note 2); see also text accompanying notes 27-34.
21. See State v Mize, 316 NC 48, 340 SE2d 439 (1986) (rejecting the defendant's argument that
shooting was in self-defense eight hours after victim's threats to get revenge against defendant, and on
a separate encounter in which defendant went to victim's dwelling and awoke victim). The Mize case
involved an altercation between two men of comparable physical strength.
22. Generally, one need not retreat from one's own dwelling before exercising deadly force self-
defense. Disagreement seems to exist, however, on whether one must retreat from one's own dwelling
when the assailant resides there as well, see Robinson § 131(d)(3), 2 Criminal Law Defenses 86-87 (cited
in note 18), text cited in notes 59-62. In the eighth tentative draft of the Model Penal Code the
relevant provision was: "(1) the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work,
unless he was the initial aggressor [or is assailed by another person whose dwelling or place of work
the actor knows it to be] .. " MPC 5 3.04(2)(b)(iii)(1) (Comments Tent Draft 1958). The bracketed
language was still in debate at the time the draft was published, see id. The proposed official draft
requires retreat from a common workplace but not from a common dwelling, see MPC at
S 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1) (cited in note 19).
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years, which is sometimes interpreted as indicating her consent to the
battering relationship. 23 The retreat rule, although intended to avoid the
unnecessary taking of human life, does not require that one do so unless
possible with complete safety. Battered women often resort to the police
or other institutional help to no avail.24 Women who simply flee from
battering relationships often meet with even more brutal treatment when
they are found and forced to return to the batterer, and with threats of
death if they ever try to escape again. 25 In some cases even efforts toward
relocation 26 or divorce 27 have not prevented her continued harassment.
In fact, most courts denying the right to exercise self-defense never reach
the issue of retreat. Instead they generally rule out self-defense because no
imminent attack occurred. 28
Subjectively, the defendant must have believed that the objective cir-
cumstances required for exercising self-defense actually existed. In addi-
tion, her beliefs must have been reasonable.29 In the United States, the
defendant's beliefs, or his or her reasonable beliefs, are usually incorpo-
rated into the actual definition of self-defense. Thus, the Model Penal
Code defines self-defense as justifiable "when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary." 30 Other formulations require that the
actor reasonably believe that the force was necessary. 31 If the defendant
23. See Marcus, 69 Cal L Rev at 1677-79 (cited in note 12), (consent, even if given, cannot free
the attacker from prosecution for serious physical injury); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice Sys-
tem's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 Wash L Rev 267, 279-85
(1985).
24. See Marcus, 69 Cal L Rev at 1687-704 (cited in note 12); Waits, 60 Wash L Rev at 279-85
(cited in note 23); Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 Hastings LJ 895, 895-
917 (1981).
25. See Hodges, 716 P2d 563 (cited in note 15) (victim beat defendant until she was unconscious
breaking her jaw, because she had left him and threatened to kill her if she ever left again); Kelly, 478
A2d 364 (cited in note 15) (victim beat defendant threatening to kill and dismember her if she ever
left him); Gallegos, 719 P2d 1268 (cited in note 14) (victim held loaded gun to defendant's head and
threatened to shoot defendant if she ever left him); Norman, 378 SE2d at 8 (victim found and beat
defendant for leaving him) (cited in note 2); Dell Martin, Battered Wives at 76-79 (Glide, 1976); Waits,
60 Wash L Rev at 283 (cited in note 23).
26. See Hundley, 693 P2d 475 (cited in note 3).
27. See Allery, 682 P2d 312 (cited in note 15) (victim entered defendant's house in violation of
divorce related restraining orders).
28." See State v Stewart, 763 Kan 639, 763 P2d 572 (1988) (no imminent attack from sleeping
spouse); Norman, 378 SE2d at 8 (cited in note 2).
29. In Norman, the court defined self-defense in part as follows: "(1) it appeared to defendant
and he believed it to be necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself from death or great
bodily harm; and (2) defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to
him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness
...." (citing State v Gappins, 320 NC 64, 357 SE2d 654, 659 (1987)). Norman, 366 SE2d at 590 (cited
in note 6).
30. MPC S 3.04(1) (cited in note 19).
31. See Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses 5 184 at 395-420 (cited in note 18).
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does not believe, or does not reasonably believe, that defensive force is
necessary, then the defense fails entirely.32 If the defendant reasonably
believes that the force is necessary, then the action is justified even
though the objective requirements for self-defense are not fulfilled.33 It is
on this basis that courts permit a self-defense claim on behalf of battered
women who kill their sleeping husbands. 34 If, because of the battering
relationship, the defendant perceived herself to be imminently35
threatened with great bodily harm or death and saw no other means to
avoid that threat, then she may be justified if the jury decides that her
belief was reasonable. This standard, while obviating the need to fulfill
the objective requirements of self-defense, 36 depends on the standard of
32. The Model Penal Code cites the inclusion of reasonableness in self-defense definitions as
excluding the defense and making the mistaken actor liable for the intentionally consummated of-
fense even though his mistake was negligent. To avoid that result, the Model Penal Code includes
only the requirement that the actor believe that the defensive force was necessary, MPC S 3.04(l)
(Comments Tent Draft 1958). If the actor is mistaken, then he may still be liable for the recklessly or
negligently committed offense depending upon whether his mistake was reasonable, MPC at S 3.09(2)
(cited in note 19). What the Model Penal Code overlooks is that the unknowingly justified actor
should perhaps also not be held responsible for the fully consummated offense. If the actor's conduct
is objectively correct, he does not in fact cause the harm that is sought to be prevented by the crimi-
nal norm in question. If the mistake relates to elements of the offense definition (the actor thinks he
is shooting at a person but in fact he shoots a mannequin), then we hold him responsible for at-
tempted and not consummated murder. The issue is whether the same evaluation should be made
when the actor does not know that he is being attacked and kills the aggressor, thus saving his own
life, see Paul Robinson, A Theory of Justication: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23
UCLA L Rev 266 (1975); George Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr.
Robinson, 23 UCLA L Rev 293 (1975); B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond
the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 Wayne L Rev 1289, 1310-32 (1987).
33. If one adheres to the doctrine that justified action is legally proper behavior that can be
assisted by third parties and that cannot be interfered with, then the objective requirements of the
defense also must be fulfilled, see Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 762-69 (cited in note 9); Robin-
son, I Criminal Law Defenses S 27(e) at 114-15 (cited in note 9); Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses
S 121(c) at 7-9 (cited in note 18); id S 122(c) at 18-19.
34. See Gallegos, 719 P2d at 1271 (cited in note 14), citing State v Roybal, 33 NM 187, 262 P 929
(1927): "The defendant must show that she was in fear of an apparent or immediate danger. The
defendant, however, need not prove that she was in actual danger."
35. "Imminently" must include the threat of future harm. This interpretation seems justified in
cases in which waiting would mean sacrificing the possibility to defend altogether. If the battered
woman cannot defend herself after the spouse has awakened, she should be able to react before that
point in time. Since the point in time at which one awakens is indeterminable, the attack would be
imminent under this broader interpretation at any time while the spouse was still asleep.
36. The standard itself is problematic. If one accepts the "incompatibility thesis": "(1)n any
situation of physical conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us from recognizing
that more than one of the parties could be justified in using force," and the party acting in putative
self-defense is justified, then the putative attacker would have no right to defend even though he was
not the initiator of the original attack. George Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv L Rev
949, 975 (1985). For arguments questioning the appropriateness of the incompatibility thesis, see
Kent Greenawalt, 84 Colum L Rev at 1922-25 (cited in note 9); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About
the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32
UCLA L Rev 61, 86-88 (1984).
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reasonableness ad6pted by the courts. Indeed, the reasonableness stan-
dard seems responsible for the wide latitude in treatment of battered
women.
B. The Standard of Reasonableness
The problem posed by the reasonableness requirement is whether an
objective or subjective standard of reasonableness applies37 when judging
the actor's behavior. The objectivity or subjectivity of the reasonableness
standard, however, should not be seen as merely a two-pronged issue but
rather as a question of degrees of objectivity or subjectivity. How objec-
tive or subjective the standard should be depends upon what one is at-
tempting to decide. A completely objective standard is appropriate only
for defining norms of conduct and making factual determinations but
never is appropriate for judging the actor's responsibility for objectively
determined wrongs.38 A completely objective standard, therefore, may be
relevant in deciding whether the battered woman's conduct was wrongful
in some abstract sense, but not in deciding whether that wrongful con-
duct can be attributed to her as her responsibility. For this reason, evi-
dence of the battering relationship and its effect on the defendant is
always relevant to some issue of responsibility, and its exclusion or the
failure to instruct the jury on its relevance should constitute reversible
error.
In Section 1, different types of judgments inherent to the criminal
law provide a background for an analysis of the reasonableness standard.
Section 2 proposes a four-level approach to reasonableness, differentiated
according to degrees of objectivity and subjectivity, each level relating to a
particular type of determination relevant to the criminal law. The simple
objective approach is insufficient for judging individual responsibility;
Section 3 illustrates how courts have erred. One such error lies in discon-
tinuing the inquiry entirely after the objective standard has been applied
in a self-defense case. Section 4 offers a German solution to this type of
restrictive analysis of self-defense. Section 5 reviews another error of slip-
ping from an "objective" standard that is relevant for some issues of indi-
vidual responsibility to one that is so abstract it distorts the responsibility
issue all together. In contrast, courts that apply the so-called "subjective"
37. Some authors refer to the actor's actual belief as the "subjective standard," and to the sub-
jective standard of the reasonableness of the actor's actual beliefs as the "subjective standard," see
Note, The Killing of a Passive Victim, 11 Camp L Rev at 272-73 (cited in note 17). Here, "subjective
standard" refers only to the subjective standard of the reasonableness of the actor's actual beliefs.
The requirement that the actor actually believe in circumstances that must exist for self-defense to be
an issue is here the "belief requirement."
38. See Byrd, 33 Wayne L Rev at 1301-32 (cited in note 32); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv L Rev 625 (1984).
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standard allow for a more differentiated approach to the mistaken actor
in self-defense cases. Section 6 discusses the advantages of this mixed
approach. Section 7 seeks to justify the battered woman's defensive ac-
tion under the common law of self-defense.
1. General Structure of Criminal Law Judgments. There are four dif-
ferent types of determinations that are actually included in a final judg-
ment to punish a criminal wrongdoer. Two of them are objective: one
abstract, and one concrete. The other two relate to attribution, one of
the act to the actor and the other of blame to the actor for that act, and
depend upon the actor's subjective state.
Under the principle nulla poena sine lege, one may not punish some-
one for conduct that has not been expressly designated as criminally
wrongful. Since criminal norms must guide conduct, a potential actor
must have fair warning that certain conduct is impermissible so that he
has an opportunity to act accordingly. The first necessary component of
a punishment judgment, therefore, is the definition of the criminal of-
fense. Very similar to this determination is one that defines certain ex-
ceptions to the criminal norm, or justifications for otherwise prohibited
conduct. Killing another human being is prohibited, but it may be the
correct response to an attack on the life of the actor. Taking someone
else's car may be criminally prohibited behavior, but doing so with the
owner's consent or, even without the owner's consent, to rush a dying
patient to the hospital may be completely appropriate behavior. Determi-
nations of offense definitions and their exceptions are nomothetic. They
do not depend on the actual occurrence of specific events and do not
relate to a particular actor. Instead they are abstract hypothetical descrip-
tions addressed to society generally or to each individual as a potential
actor.
The first concrete decision in a criminal case concerns objective real-
ity. It too is independent of a particular actor. Whether the victim was
killed or died of natural causes determines whether the criminal justice
system is an appropriate forum for proceeding with what society considers
to be an undesirable result, namely the death of a human being. Still
objective and concrete is the determination that a certain actor caused the
victim's death and similarly that the victim was attacking the actor with
deadly force at the time of the killing. A causal evaluation does not in-
clude considerations of individual responsibility, since it says nothing
more than that certain physical occurrences are related to each other in a
specific way. Thus a person may cause the death of another by acciden-
tally falling out of a window onto the victim below without being any
more responsible for the victim's death than a falling rock.
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The first consideration of individual responsibility regards the attri-
bution of an act to an actor.39 Whether the actor actively killed the vic-
tim depends upon whether the actor was in control of his bodily
movements and knew of all the facts connecting him to the victim's
death. If the actor served tea to a guest without knowing that it was laced
with poison, then he may have objectively caused the victim's death, but
he did not "kill" the victim in any meaningful sense.40 The actor's subjec-
tive beliefs, therefore, are central to-associating him with certain harms
that objectively occurred.
A second issue of individual responsibility concerns the attribution
of blame to an actor for his wrongful conduct.41 Responsibility presumes
an objective determination of wrongdoing attributed to a certain person
as his act. Even though an actor may be responsible for wrongdoing, he
or she still may not be blameworthy. Not blaming an actor for wrongful
conduct is usually a recognition of the fact that he or she was in some way
unable to conform his or her conduct to the criminal law norm, either
because of the particular situation or because of a temporary or perma-
nent inability to appreciate the wrongful nature of that conduct. The
wrongdoing, therefore, does not reflect disrespect for the criminal law nor
provide any indication of how he or she would act if not in the debilitat-
ing situation or state. Blaming someone for conduct in situations in
which the average person could not do better would be contrary to the
notion of condign punishment in a criminal justice system.
In a possible self-defense case, the actor's subjective state of mind
becomes relevant after two objective determinations have been made.
First of all, the actor's behavior must be criminally prohibited and self-
defense must be a recognized exception to that prohibition. Second,
there must be a causal relationship between the actor and the prohibited
harm, and there must be objective proof of the occurrence of the prereq-
uisites of self-defense. After making these objective determinations, one
must examine the actor's subjective beliefs to determine whether one may
attribute the prohibited but justified harm to him as his actions. 42 It is at
this point that the reasonableness standard commonly comes into play.
Assuming, as in the battered woman case under consideration, that the
defendant knew she was killing her husband, the issue is whether one can
attribute a killing in self-defense to her.43 This question depends upon
39. See Joachim Hruschka, Imputation, 1986 BYU L Rev 669, 682-84 (1986).
40. Whether the actor perhaps was reckless or negligent with respect to the contents of his tea
raises the relevant question for the purposes of this article. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
41. See Hruschka, 1986 BYU L Rev at 676-80 (cited in note 39).
42. See note 40 and accompanying text.
43. If she was mistaken, the objective determination for self-defense has not been made. Still,
what she thought she was doing is relevant to what may be attributed to her, just as what the actor
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her beliefs with respect to the necessity of the defensive action. If she was
mistaken, then it becomes important whether her beliefs were
"reasonable."
2. Subjectivity and Objectivity in the Reasonableness Standard. In ad-
dition to what actions the defendant in any possible self-defense case actu-
ally believed was necessary defense,44 one can consider: (1) the
defendant's psychological condition, and decide what would have been
reasonable for that particular defendant, with all of his or her individual
psychological quirks, to have believed. In a battering case, if the battered
spouse has become psychologically debilitated through the relationship,
one must decide what would be reasonable for someone with that debilita-
tion to believe; (2) the defendant's personal condition and decide what
would have been reasonably believed by anyone who had actually exper-
ienced what the defendant experienced. In a battering case, if the defend-
ant has been beaten often in the past and has developed excessive fear of
any type of threat, one must determine what would be reasonable for
someone with that fear to believe; (3) the defendant's knowledge broadly
conceived and question what would have been reasonably believed by
anyone who knew, but had not experienced, all of the facts that were
available to the defendant, both prior to and at the time of the act. In a
battering case, if the defendant has been subjected to severe mistreatment
over a period of years, has recognized that her spouse tends to go through
phases during which he is more likely to react with violence, knows that
one of these phases is in progress, knows that he has threatened to beat
and kill her, knows that he tends to be violent after awakening from an
afternoon nap, and knows that he is now sleeping, one must determine
what would be reasonable for someone with that knowledge to believe; (4)
the defendant's knowledge narrowly conceived and ask what would have
been reasonably believed by anyone who knew only the facts available to
the defendant at the time he acted, but none of the surrounding facts. In
a battering case, if the defendant knows only that the victim is asleep, one
must determine what would be reasonable for someone with that knowl-
edge to believe.
serving tea with poison thought he was doing is relevant to what act may be attributed to him. One,
however, would refer to the mistaken self-defender as acting in putative self-defense.
44. The defendant's actual belief fulfills the belief requirement, see note 37, but the reasonable-
ness standard conceivably could be totally subjective and therefore satisfied by actual belief. The
problem with equating actual belief with reasonable belief is that one no longer has a "standard" for
judging behavior, see Fletcher, Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial at 41-62 (cited in note 4). Fletcher
seems to favor an "objective" standard of reasonableness, which is not a necessary conclusion from
the need to have a standard for judging behavior.
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Each of these levels represents a different degree of subjectivity-objec-
tivity and each is relevant to some form of decision within the criminal
justice system.
The first two levels are pertinent to the attribution of blame to an
actor. The first level, concerning the defendant's psychological condition,
represents what is relevant in excusing a defendant. It focuses on the
defendant's individual quirks and recognizes that although the particular
response was not reasonable for the average person, it was reasonable or
understandable for someone suffering from the defendant's debility. Ex-
cuses corresponding to this level of subjectivity are insanity, infancy and
intoxication. 45 The second level, concerning the defendant's personal
condition, also relates to excusing a defendant. It requires recognition
that although the defendant is not handicapped in his general ability to
conform his actions to the law, in the particular situation he was pres-
sured beyond what any reasonable person probably could have with-
stood.46 Excuses corresponding to this level of subjectivity are duress and
necessity,47 and the German excuse for certain actions exceeding the lim-
its of self-defense. 48 Determinations on both levels one and two recognize
45. Although most United States courts do not recognize intoxication, or at least voluntary
intoxication, as an excuse, such an excuse is recognized in Germany. If the intoxication was volun-
tary, but to such a degree as to negate the intent necessary to commit the crime or negate the defend-
ant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, he would be acquitted of the crime he
committed but possibly would be convicted of the separate crime of "total intoxication." A condi-
tion precedent for conviction of this offense is that the defendant, while in the intoxicated state,
committed a crime for which he cannot be convicted because of the effects of the intoxication. See
Strafgesetzbuch S 323a ("StGB"). According to MPC S 2.08 (cited in note 19), intoxication is a
defense if it negates an "element of the offense." An "element of the offense" includes the culpability
requirements of purpose and knowledge for purposes of the intoxication defense. Id SS 2.08(2) and
2.02(2).
46. Kant, in discussing necessity and the case in which a drowning man pushes another off a life-
supporting plank, arguably recognizes excuses as those cases in which the law cannot have the re-
quired deterrent effect since "the punishment threatened by the law cannot be greater than the loss
of life threatened. Such a criminal law can never have the intended effect since the threat with an evil
that is uncertain (death penalty through court judgment) cannot outweigh the fear of an evil that is
certain (namely drowning)." Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, reprinted in K~niglich
Preuische Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed, 6 Kant's gesammelte Schriften 203, 235 (de Gruyter, 2d
1922); see B. Sharon Byrd, Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execu-
tion, 8 L & Phil 151, 189 (1989). In those cases in which the criminal law cannot deter, one cannot
execute the threatened punishment, id at 190-91. In Judy Norman's case the facts seem to correspond
to the type of situation Kant was describing. At trial, in answer to the question of why she killed her
husband, she testified, "Because I was scared of him and I knowed when he woke up, it was going to
be the same thing.... I just couldn't take it no more. There ain't no way, even if it means going to
prison. It's better than living in that. That's worse hell than anything." Norman, 378 SE2d at I 1
(cited in note 2).
47. Necessity here is meant as an excuse, namely when the actor out of fear violates the criminal
law but does not save an interest of higher value than the interest he damages (as in the plank
example cited in note 46).
48. StGB S 33 (cited in note 45); see notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, thereby presupposing the at-
tribution of a wrongful act to the defendant. Nonetheless, they exclude
the possibility of treating him in the same way that one would treat an-
other person who was not suffering from the debility or unusual pressure
that confronted the particular defendant.
The third level, the defendant's knowledge broadly conceived, ex-
cludes consideration of the personal agony the defendant experienced,
but includes knowledge of all of the facts preceding the prohibited con-
duct. It is relevant to attributing both a proscribed harm and a possible
justification for this harm to a defendant. In a self-defense case it con-
cerns the defendant's correct interpretation of available data and the "ob-
jectively" reasonable response to the particular situation. Finally, the
fourth level, the defendant's knowledge narrowly conceived, represents
complete objectivity because of its total abstraction from the individual
situation. It is relevant, not to judging an individual for his conduct, but
rather to defining what type of conduct reasonably can and should be
prohibited or justified.
If one superimposes these four levels of subjectivity-objectivity in the
reasonableness standard on those battered woman cases in which the jury
could decide that the defendant actually believed 49 that the defensive re-
sponse was necessary, the first three levels relate to her responsibility for
killing her spouse. A battering relationship could be so serious that it
affects the psychological balance of the defendant to the extent that it
distorts either her ability to perceive what she is doing or to appreciate
the wrongfulness of her conduct. 50 If so, evidence of the relationship and
its psychologically debilitating effects would be relevant, on the first level
of subjectivity, to determining the validity of an insanity or diminished
capacity defense. In other battering relationships, the woman's psycho-
logical balance may not be disturbed to the extent that an insanity or
diminished capacity defense would be appropriate. Self-defense may also
be inappropriate because an action short of actually killing the spouse
may have provided sufficient protection. The defendant, however, may
have overreacted out of extreme fear and pressure brought on by the situ-
ation. In such cases, one must determine whether a person of reasonable
firmness could have lived with the relationship as the defendant exper-
ienced it, or whether he too could have exceeded the limits of the defense
49. Actual belief is equal to satisfying the belief requirement, see note 37.
50. Apparently that was not true in the Norman case although the psychiatric expert testified
that the treatment Judy Norman received from her spouse was similar to the "brainwashing tech-
niques of the Korean War," see Norman, 378 SE2d at 17 (Martin dissenting) (cited in note 2); but see
Leidholm 334 NW2d at 822-23 (cited in note 9) in which the issue had been raised at trial but accord-
ing to the Supreme Court insufficiently to support the defendant's motion for acquittal.
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necessary for his own protection because of momentary fear.51 Reasona-
bleness on the second level of subjectivity would be appropriate in these
cases. The third level, knowledge broadly conceived, is relevant for the
judge or jury in deciding what can be attributed to the defendant as her
actions. This determination depends on what the defendant actually be-
lieved and on what the objectively reasonable person, embodied in the
judge or jury, would have believed. In a case in which the defendant be-
lieves she is being attacked, the issue under level three reasonableness is
whether the average person knowing everything the defendant knew also
would have concluded that she was being attacked. If so, and if an attack
was in fact in progress at the time of the defensive action, one can say that
the defendant was subjectively and objectively justified. If an attack was
not in progress but the average person would have assumed that it were,
then one could conclude that the mistake was not negligent in an objec-
tively reasonable sense. The fourth level, knowledge narrowly conceived,
relates to the individual case only in that it provides the norms for sub-
sumption of the objectively determined facts and a means of determining
these facts.
3. Objective Standard and Premature Discontinuation of the Inquiry.
One problem that arises in jurisdictions which adopt the so-called "objec-
tive" standard is that the courts prematurely interrupt their analysis of
individual responsibility. Section 4 will consider a German solution to
this problem.
In cases applying level three reasonableness, when the defendant's
beliefs do not meet this criterion, the correct conclusion should be that
the defendant made an objectively unreasonable mistake. The question
then should be whether she is to blame for that mistake. Applying both
level one and level two reasonableness will determine her culpability.
Many courts simply conclude that the level three standard of reasonable-
ness in exercising self-defense is not fulfilled, ignore other possible total
mitigation based on an excuse 52 and affirm the conviction. This problem
can be illustrated quite well in the case of Judy Norman. The North Car-
olina Supreme Court in that case apparently decided that the defendant
had been mistaken in her evaluation of the need to exercise deadly force
51. It is here that expert testimony of the type offered by Walker on the "learned helplessness"
acquired by women who are battered may be appropriate. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome
(cited in note 11); but see Note, A Legal and Empirical Dissent at 630-43 (cited in note 17), for a critical
examination of the validity of this type of evidence.
52. Total mitigation means acquitting the defendant entirely, for example, excusing the mistake;
partial mitigation means reducing the gravity of the offense charged, for example, from murder to
manslaughter.
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self-defense and insisted that the third level of reasonableness was appro-
priate for perfect 53 self-defense in North Carolina:
It is far from clear in the defendant's poignant evidence that any abuse
by the decedent had ever involved the degree of physical threat re-
quired to justify the defendant in using deadly force, even when those
threats were imminent. The use of deadly force in self-defense to pre-
vent harm other than death or great bodily harm is excessive as a mat-
ter of law.54
Accordingly, even assuming that Judy Norman's husband had been
awake and in the process of battering her rather than sleeping at the time
she killed him, the court clearly ruled out self-defense as a justified re-
sponse. Similarly, in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,55 in which the defend-
ants were lost at sea for twenty-one days with almost no food and drink
and killed a young boy to sustain themselves, the Queen's Bench ruled
out necessity as a justified response to the situation facing the two defend-
ants. Still the issue of excuse clearly remained open. Indeed, the Queen
pardoned them six months later.56 An excuse based on necessity recog-
nizes that although the defendant's reaction to the extraordinary situa-
tion was not reasonable in the sense of level three objectivity it was an
understandable response, which any person of reasonable firmness in the
defendant's shoes might have made. In battering cases in which a court
might decide that the self-defense justification is inapplicable as a matter
of law, evidence of the battering relationship, like evidence of the neces-
sity facing Dudley and Stephens, could certainly be relevant to an excuse
for the defendant's conduct.57
53. In North Carolina "perfect" self-defense is justified and depends on the "objectively" rea-
sonable belief in the necessity of the defensive action to save oneself from imminent death or great
bodily harm in situations in which the defendant was not the original aggressor and the harm in-
flicted was not excessive. "Imperfect" self-defense is not justified but operates to mitigate the offense,
that is, from murder to voluntary manslaughter. It comes into play when the defendant, without
murderous intent, used excessive force in defending against the attack or was the original aggressor,
see Norman, 366 SE2d at 590 (cited in note 6).
54. Norman, 378 SE2d at 15 (citing State v Hunter, 315 NC 371, 338 SE2d 99 (1986)) (cited in
note 2).
55. Regina v Dudley and Stephens, [1884] 14 QBD 273.
56. This case is cited among scholars of criminal law as indicating the need to distinguish justifi-
cations from excuses. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 823-27 (cited in note 9); Hans-Heinrich
Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Algemeiner Teil 175 (Duncker & Humblot, 4th ed 1988). Since the
distinction had been lost in the common law at the time Dudley and Stephens was decided, the English
court could not both decide that the killing was wrongful (not justified) and not punishable (excused).
The same result is reached, of course, but with less theoretical consistency, by convicting the defend-
ants and pardoning them shortly thereafter.
57. See Graff, 10 Loyola LA Intl & Comp LJ I (cited in note 17), who argues for necessity as an
excuse in battered woman cases. Graff bases her arguments on her interpretation of German law, but
see text cited in notes 90-144 for an argument for necessity as a justification, based on the author's
interpretation of German law.
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4. German Approach to Self-Defense and Excessive Self-Defense. In
Germany, section 32 of the Strafgesetzbuch provides a justification for
self-defense.5 8 For the provision to apply, the defendant's response must
in fact have been necessary to ward off the attack, and a false belief will
not support a self-defense justification. German law also mitigates punish-
ment when the defendant kills in the heat of passion.5 9
What German law includes that U.S. law does not is an excuse for
using what might be called "excessive self-defense." Section 33 of the
Strafgesetzbuch provides: "If the actor exceeds the limits of self-defense
because of confusion, fear, or fright he is not to be punished." The sec-
tion is interpreted to require that the defendant found herself in a situa-
tion that would justify a self-defensive response 6° but that the amount of
force exercised was excessive. Section 33 provides for acquittal rather
than mitigation of punishment 6' as in cases of heat-of-passion manslaugh-
ter. Furthermore, it offers an excuse rather than the justification afforded
for "perfect" self-defense. In addition to convicting a defendant for con-
summated murder or manslaughter, 62 German courts thus can react to
three different types of battered-woman cases. 63 If they find that the de-
58. "Self-defense. (1) One who commits an act that is required by self-defense does not act
wrongfully. (2) Self-defense is the defense required to ward off a present, wrongful attack from oneself
or another." StGB S 32 (cited in note 45). A closer translation of the German term "Notwehr" is
"necessary defense" rather than "self-defense" since StGB S 32 applies both to the defense of self and
defense of others.
59. StGB S 213 provides: "If, through no fault of his own, the manslaughterer was enraged
through the victim's mistreatment or serious defamation of the defendant himself or of a relative and
thereby immediately aggravated to act... punishment of between six months and five years shall be
imposed." Id (cited in note 45) (instead of the minimum of five years for voluntary manslaughter,
StGB S 212).
60. Section 33 does not apply if the defendant was mistaken as to whether he was being at-
tacked. There are several theories in Germany on the effect of this type of mistake. Some scholars
argue that putative self-defense is an excuse. Others treat the false assumption of circumstances that
would justify the defendant's action if they in fact existed as negating the intent required for the
offense. The question then is whether the defendant was negligent in making the mistake. Under the
former theory, the defendant will be punished only if he could have avoided the mistake. Under the
latter, he will punished only if the negligent commission of the offense is punishable. See StGB SS 16
and 17 (cited in note 45).
61. Since StGB S 33 provides for acquittal it is not to be equated with imperfect self-defense
which only reduces the level of the offense from murder to manslaughter. Id (cited in note 45); see
also Norman, 378 SE2d at 12-13 (cited in note 2).
62. StGB S 212 provides: "Manslaughter. (1) One who kills a human being but is not a mur-
derer shall be punished as a manslaughterer with imprisonment for a term not less than five years. (2)
Life imprisonment shall be imposed in particularly serious cases." Murder is distinguished from man-
slaughter through accompanying aggravating circumstances such as "greed" or "in order to conceal
another crime" and is punished with life-imprisonment, see StGB S 211 (cited in note 45).
63. All of the responses are independent from the possible reactions a court may have in cases in
which the defendant was mistaken as to some fact relevant to the offense definition, the justification
or the excuse. If the mistake cases are added, the range of possible reactions to the defendant's action
are increased considerably.
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fendant was in imminent danger of a wrongful attack and that the force
she used to ward off the attack was necessary they can justify her action
and acquit her. If they find that she was in imminent danger of a wrong-
ful attack but that the force she used was excessive, they can excuse her
action and still acquit her. If they find that she was not in imminent
danger of a wrongful attack, but rather reacted out of rage at the victim's
provocation, they can mitigate the punishment to that appropriate for
voluntary manslaughter. The message the courts give to the public in
each of these cases is significantly different. In the first case, the courts
indicate that individuals in the defendant's situation may rightfully kill an
aggressor. In the second case, the courts suggest that it was wrong to kill
the aggressor in a situation similar to that of the defendant's. Still they
may recognize that the defendant is not blameworthy. The defendant's
fearful response, "reasonable" in the sense of level one or two in the
above analysis, in situations in which her assailant is physically superior to
herself can be a reason to have compassion for her because of her individ-
ual situation. Finally, the courts can hold that it was wrong to kill the
aggressor and that the defendant is blameworthy for her action, but that
the killing probably would not have occurred had the victim not pro-
voked the defendant. Punishment can be reduced because the danger the
defendant presents generally is minimal or even non-existent and she
seems less worthy of punishment than one who kills when not aggravated.
The excuse of excessive self-defense would seem to be a positive addi-
tion to the common law defenses in more than just battered wife cases. In
the Goetz case,64 Bernhard Goetz was charged with the attempted murder
of four subway assailants, who Goetz claimed attempted to rob him.
Goetz pleaded self-defense, and under New York law deadly force is a
permissible response to a robbery. Goetz was acquitted of all charges ex-
cept illegal possession of a weapon. The case was highly debated across
the country, most significantly because Goetz was acquitted even though
he fired a final shot at one of the assailants after he had been hit once and
had fallen to the floor. Self-defense as a justification cannot apply to that
final shot, since the aggressor was already incapacitated. If one applied a
reasonableness standard with level two subjectivity to self-defense, namely
what was reasonable for someone with the defendant's experiences, how-
ever, one could arrive at the conclusion that Goetz acted in self-defense.
The level of subjectivity appropriate for the reasonableness standard
under the New York law of self-defense was at issue during the indictment
proceedings before the Grand Jury and during trial. The experiences pos-
64. People v Goetz, 131 Misc 2d 1, 502 NYS2d 577 (1986); People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96, 497 NE2d
41 (1986); People v Goetz, 116 AD2d 316, 501 NYS2d 326 (1986); Fletcher, Bernhard Goetz and the
Law on Tria at 39-62 (cited in note 4).
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sibly relevant to level two subjectivity in the Goetz case were those that
Goetz had acquired as a victim of two other robberies, one of which oc-
curred in a subway station. The fearful response, which perhaps was ex-
cessive for a person who had never been robbed, could have been seen by
the jury as reasonable for someone with Goetz's past. If level two subjec-
tivity were appropriate to judge the reasonableness of the defendant's re-
sponse for the self-defense justification, then Goetz would have been
justified. However, if justification means that the defendant's conduct
was an appropriate response, then it seems strange that shooting a
wounded and fallen assailant should be justified. The last shot seems sig-
nificantly different from the first four. Applying the German excuse of
"excessive self-defense" to the case would permit a differentiation be-
tween the first four shots and the final one, the first four being justified as
the reasonable response on the third level of subjectivity and the final
shot excused as the reasonable response on the second level of subjectiv-
ity. Acquittal is also possible in a legal system without this excuse, but at
the cost of lowering the standard of reasonableness to the level of subjec-
tivity appropriate for an excuse. The message to the public as it is trans-
ferred through the judgment, however, cannot be as lucid as it could be if
both self-defense as a justification and "excessive self-defense" as an ex-
cuse were available. One other way the differentiation would be available
under the common law would be necessity as an excuse with respect to
the last shot, a solution that is certainly similar to the German solution.
In Judy Norman's case, the jury, which did not have the benefit of
considering self-defense, convicted her of voluntary manslaughter. Since
she was charged with first degree murder, the verdict indicates the jury's
willingness to mitigate punishment because of the battering relationship.
They were not instructed, however, on either perfect or imperfect 65 self-
defense or on any excuse that would have freed the defendant from pun-
ishment entirely. If individuals are to be punished according to their level
of responsibility for causing criminally prohibited harms, the jury should
be instructed on the difference between voluntary manslaughter, often
committed in the heat of rage,66 and excused homicide, committed in a
state of complete anxiety and hopelessness, a situation in which "the law
can never have the intended effect." 67
65. In North Carolina, the availability of imperfect self-defense also would only have reduced the
conviction from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The failure to instruct on this defense, therefore,
did not have any affect on the result in this case, as the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out,
Norman 378 SE2d 8 at 12-13 (cited in note 2).
66. See Comment, 33 UCLA L Rev 1679 (cited in note 12).
67. See note 46 and accompanying text.
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5. Excessive Objectivity in Judging Individual Responsibility. Another
problem that arises in jurisdictions employing the objective standard of
reasonableness is that they apply level four reasonableness, which is too
abstract for judging individual responsibility. They employ the argument
that if the defendant were acquitted entirely, then all defendants similarly
situated would have a license to kill their spouses. Again, this problem
can be illustrated by the Norman case.
The dissenting opinion in Norman provides a fair statement of an
"objective" standard of reasonableness in the sense of level three,
stressing that the defendant's beliefs and not only objective occurrences
are relevant:
Properly stated, the second prong of the question (whether the circum-
stances as the defendant saw them were sufficient to create such a belief
in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness) is not whether the threat
was in fact imminent, but whether the defendant's belief in the impend-
ing nature of the threat, given the circumstances as she saw them, was
reasonable in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness. 68
The third level of objectivity, knowledge broadly conceived, empha-
sizes that the "objective" test of reasonableness must include all of the
knowledge acquired by the defendant both before and at the time of the
killing, and not merely the information available at the moment she ac-
ted, the latter being relevant to the abstract level four standard, knowl-
edge narrowly conceived. As a practical matter, the difference between
level three and level four is the difference between knowledge of the bat-
tering relationship and knowledge only of the fact that the batterer is
asleep at the moment. With level four reasonableness, the question be-
comes: "Is it reasonable to assume that someone who is sleeping presents
an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily harm?" With level three
reasonableness the question instead in the Norman case would be: "Is it
reasonable to assume that someone who has battered the defendant over
a course of years, has thereby inflicted grievous bodily harm upon her, has
been in the process of battering her for the past thirty-six hours, has
threatened to kill her, has the propensity to resume battering after sleep-
ing off an excessive amount of alcohol and is currently sleeping after hav-
ing consumed an excessive amount of alcohol, presents a threat of serious
bodily harm or death if he awakens?" Level three is objective because it
does not consider the emotional effects of the battering relationship on
the defendant, as does level two, the defendant's personal condition. It,
however, is not totally abstracted from the actual situation in which the
defendant finds herself, as is level four reasonableness. The dissent here
68. Norman, 378 SE2d at 19 Judge Martin dissenting) (cited in note 2) (parenthetical informa-
tion added but quoted from the dissent, id at 17).
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criticizes the majority for applying this latter standard. In discussing the
"imminence" requirement the majority states:
Such reasoning proposes justifying the taking of human life not upon
the reasonable belief it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily
harm-which the imminence requirement ensures-but upon purely
subjective speculation that the decedent probably would present a
threat to life at a future time and that the defendant would not be able
to avoid the predicted threat.... Homicidal self-help would then be-
come a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest and most effective solu-
tion to this problem.69
Leaving aside the dubious conclusion of the majority that the in-
flicting of bodily harm in the form of crushing glass in the defendant's
face and leaving permanent scars is not "great bodily harm," there are
two serious problems with the majority's reasoning. A belief is always
based upon speculation since it is formed in the absence of actual knowl-
edge of that which is believed. Regardless of what standard of objectivity
one adopts for reasonable belief, that belief is per se speculative. It is for
the jury to decide whether such speculation is reasonable, as the dissent in
the Norman case points out.70 In addition, the majority rejects evidence
of the battering relationship as a possible basis for reasonable belief in the
necessity of using deadly force. Accordingly, it raises the objectivity level
of reasonable belief to that of level four, one completely inappropriate for
judging responsibility.71 In the absence of knowledge of the battering re-
lationship in the Norman case, the question posed would be whether kill-
ing someone who is sleeping is justifiable homicide. That question is like
the abstract question of whether killing someone should be criminally
prohibited. For the purpose of formulating general norms of conduct,
this level of objectivity is appropriate, but for the purpose of determining
whether a particular case can be subsumed under one of these general
norms, one must know more. That the majority is operating on this level
of objectivity is even more apparent from the following:
The relaxed requirements for perfect self-defense proposed by our
Court of Appeals would tend to categorically legalize the opportune killing of
69. Norman, 378 SE2d at 15 (emphasis added) (cited in note 2). One might add that if the state
continues to be unwilling to interfere in family disputes, thereby offering no protection to the bat-
tered spouse, homicidal self-help may not only be the easiest and most effective but also the only
available solution to the problem. See Marcus, 69 Cal L Rev at 1668-75, 1687-92 (cited in note 12),
for an extensive report on police inactivity in battering cases.
70. Norman, 378 SE2d at 16-17 (Martin dissenting) (cited in note 2).
71. See Wanrow, 559 P2d at 555-56 (cited in note 14) (rejecting the trial court's instruction to
the jury that it should "consider only those acts and circumstances occurring at or immediately before
the killing .. " Id at 555). The court emphasized that all of the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's action should be considered, including those that might have predated "the killing by
weeks and months .. " Id at 556 (citing State v Ellis, 30 Wash 369, 70 P 963 (1902)) or those that
existed "long before the killing." Id (citing State v Tnibett, 74 Wash 125, 132 P 875 (1913)).
TILL DEATH DO US PART
abusive husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony
concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future
felonious assaults by their husbands.72
Justifying Judy Norman's killing of her sleeping spouse is not categor-
ically legalizing killing in battering cases any more than justifying Goetz's
first four shots is categorically legalizing subway shootings. Submitting
the issue to the jury means no more than permitting them to decide
whether Judy Norman's belief that she was in danger of serious bodily
harm or even death was warranted based on the evidence available to her
at the time she shot her husband. If the jury finds that the evidence
warranted her beliefs, it means (1) if one is in imminent danger of serious
bodily harm or death through an aggressor, one may kill the aggressor,
and (2) Judy Norman was in that situation. The first statement is the law
of self-defense, the second the application of that law to Judy Norman's
individual case. Any categorical legalization involved here is merely the
statement of the already existing norm on self-defense as a justification.
The battering relationship, 73 therefore, is always relevant to the issue
of responsibility. Depending upon what relevance it has, namely what
level of subjectivity in the reasonableness standard is required to evaluate
its effects, the battering relationship may indicate that the defendant
should be excused on the basis of insanity and perhaps confined for treat-
ment, excused on the basis of necessity, or the German type of "excessive
self-defense" excuse, or justified on the basis of self-defense. 74 Even in
jurisdictions which require a reasonable belief for the application of self-
defense and which apply an objective level three standard of reasonable-
ness to that defense, the implications of the battering relationship regard-
ing level one and level two subjectivity could support an excuse and not
merely a reduction of the offense from murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter.75 Courts that slip into an excessively objective approach (level four)
abrogate their duty to judge individual responsibility. Cases in which the
court claims to be applying a subjective standard, but in reality applies a
mixed standard illustrate the advantages of considering the entire spec-
trum of reasonableness. It is to such a decision that I will now turn.
72. Nonan, 378 SE2d at 15 (emphasis added) (cited in note 2).
73. An actual battering relationship is meant here. If the victim hit the defendant once in
twenty-five years of marriage, ten years before the killing, then evidence of the "battering relation-
ship" is not relevant because there was no "battering relationship." Still the issue is one of fact and
should be decided by the jury.
74. Or justified on the basis of "defensive necessity," see notes 90-144 and accompanying text.
75. The court in Norman, 378 SE2d at 12-13, considered only perfect and imperfect self-defense
(cited in note 2). Perfect self-defense justifies the defendant and results in acquittal. Imperfect self-
defense reduces the gravity of the offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
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6. Advantages of a "Mixed" Approach. Justice Vande Walle pro-
vides an interesting twist to the treatment of mistaken actors, and one
that is more in accord with German law, in his lucid decision in State v.
Leidholm.76 Janice Leidholm, a battered spouse, appealed from a verdict
of murder for killing her sleeping husband. The trial court's instruction
to the jury expressly excluded gender in determining what the reasonably
prudent person would believe. The Supreme Court, in reversing and re-
manding, adopted a completely subjective standard (level one) for
reasonableness:
Hence, a correct statement of the law of self-defense is one in which the
court directs the jury to assume the physical and psychological proper-
ties peculiar to the accused, namely, to place itself as best it can in the
shoes of the accused, and then decide whether or not the particular
circumstances surrounding the accused at the time he used force were
sufficient to create in his mind a sincere and reasonable belief that the
use of force was necessary to protect himself from imminent and unlaw-
ful harm. 77
The court also noted that a justification for an actor's conduct is
based upon objective facts and that an excuse relates to the actor's partic-
ular perceptions:
A defense of justification is the product of society's determination that
the actual existence of certain circumstances will operate to make proper
and legal what otherwise would be criminal conduct. A defense of ex-
cuse, contrarily, does not make legal and proper conduct which ordina-
rily would result in criminal liability; instead, it openly recognizes the
criminality of the conduct but excuses it because the actor believed that
circumstances actually existed which would justify his conduct when in
fact they did not .... In the context of self-defense, this means that a
person who believes that the force he uses is necessary to prevent immi-
nent unlawful harm is justied in using such force if his belief is a correct
belief, that is to say, if his belief corresponds with what actually is the
case. If, on the other hand, a person reasonably but incorrectly believes
that the force he uses is necessary to protect himself against imminent
harm, his use of force is excused.78
The court accepted the full implications of the justification-excuse
distinction, namely that justified conduct is objectively proper conduct,
whereas excused conduct is of its nature wrongful conduct for which we
do not attribute blame to the actor. In addition the court recognized, in
contrast to the Model Penal Code, 79 that a mistaken belief can never be
the basis of a justification, since a mistaken belief cannot be any indica-
tion of objectively correct conduct. In fact, by its nature it must be objec-
76. Leidwlm, 334 NW2d 811 (cited in note 9).
77. Id at 818.
78. Id at 814-15.
79. See note 32 for the MPC treatment of mistaken acts in self-defense.
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tively wrongful. On the basis of this understanding, it is not surprising
that the court adopted a reasonableness standard geared to judging the
blameworthiness of the particular actor. Once it is understood that ex-
cuses relate to blameworthiness rather than to standards of behavior, it is
also clear that the actor's fault, and not some abstract model citizen's, is at
issue. Unlike the reasonable man standard of tort theory, which defines
acceptable standards of behavior, the reasonable man of criminal law
must represent what reasonably could have been expected from the par-
ticular defendant in the situation as he experienced it.
Under German law, if self-defense is raised in a criminal trial, the
court must first make an objective determination of whether the prerequi-
sites for this defense were fulfilled. If not, the actor's honest belief in
circumstances that would fulfill these prerequisites is still relevant. If the
court decides that the defendant sincerely believed in the existence of
circumstances that would have justified the use of defensive force, if in
fact they had existed, then the issue is whether the mistaken actor "could
have"80 avoided the mistake. The first judgment applies a standard simi-
lar to what has been described here as level four objectivity, relevant to
making factual determinations. The second issue concerns the belief re-
quirement. The third question involves personal responsibility, and is
answered on a purely individual, subjective basis similar to the level one
standard of reasonableness."' Since the German system has traditionally
separated objective determinations of fact from subjective determinations
of personal responsibility, it does not have difficulty in acquitting a de-
fendant even though the act in question was wrongful, if the defendant,
in light of his individual abilities in the concrete situation, could not help
making the mistake.
The court in Leidholm did not decide whether the defendant's use of
force was justified or excused.8 2 In fact, the court pointed out that with
respect to the result, namely avoiding punishment, it did not matter
whether the defendant's belief was correct and therefore justified, or in-
correct but reasonable and therefore excused. If the belief were unreason-
80. The full test is whether the actor "could and should have known" what in fact was happen-
ing. The "should have" element is not relevant to the discussion at hand.
81. "Culpability in cases of negligence... depends upon whether the actor according to his own
personal abilities . . . was capable of recognizing and fulfilling the duty of care imposed upon
him .... Adolf Sch~nke and Horst Schr~der, Strafgesetzbuch, Kommentar 5 15 at 245 (Beck, 23d ed
1988) ("Kommentar"). "[Tihe requirement of blameworthiness for punishment is only fulfilled if the
principle-recognized by the courts and in the literature-is taken seriously that a subjective standard
is to be employed in determining whether the actor culpably did not observe the duty of care he
owed. That means that the actor, according to his individual abilities, strengths, experiences and
recognitions, in the critical situation could have avoided the negligent act and its consequences." Id.
82. Leidholm, 334 NW2d at 823 (cited in note 9). The court reversed the trial court's conviction
based on the faulty instruction and remanded for a new trial.
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able, however, theo-defendant would be guilty of either manslaughter or
negligent homicide depending upon whether the mistake was reckless or
negligent. The real issue then was whether the belief was sincere83 and
whether that sincere belief was reasonable, according to a subjective stan-
dard. Thus, although the jury's general verdict remains undifferentiated,
the subjective standard of reasonableness, combined with the further dis-
tinction between recklessly and negligently held unreasonable beliefs, per-
mits it to find the defendant guilty of murder, manslaughter or negligent
homicide or to find the defendant not guilty because justified or not guilty
because excused either in the sense of a handicap excuse (level one) or in
the sense of a pressure-of-the moment excuse (level two). The jury may
then consider evidence of the battering relationship as relevant to the
entire spectrum of levels of responsibility for prima facie criminal con-
duct. A court that adopts an objective standard, such as the court in
Norman, excludes consideration of at least two relevant levels of responsi-
bility for wrongful acts. In combination with the legislative determination
that unreasonable beliefs in the necessity of using defensive, deadly force
leads to a conviction for voluntary manslaughter regardless of whether the
mistake was reckless or negligent, the court's standard means that the
defendant can only be guilty of murder or manslaughter, or not guilty
because justified. Such standards automatically excluded other relevant
standards for attributing blame, and one no longer can speak meaning-
fully of just deserts.
7. An Argument for a Self-Defense Justification Under the Rationale of
the Leidholm Decision and Within the Confines of the Self-Defense Justification.
Although the Leidholm court dismissed the relevance of the justification-
excuse distinction to the issue of punishment,8 4 it indicated that a correct
belief would justify the defendant's act. In battering cases in which the
defendant has killed her sleeping spouse, one can never know whether
her belief in the necessity of the defense was correct or not. Indeed, this
uncertainty is perhaps the reason why traditional definitions of self-de-
fense include the requirement that the attack be imminent.
The Model Penal Code explicitly excludes the imminence of the at-
tack requirement and instead requires that the force employed to protect
oneself be imminently necessary.85 In a jurisdiction in which the attack
need not be imminent for purposes of the self-defense justification and
83. Whether the belief was sincere raises the issue of the belief requirement, see note 37.
84. "The distinction is arguably superfluous because whether a person's belief is correct and his
conduct justified, or whether it is merely reasonable and his conduct excused, the end result is the
same, namely, the person avoids punishment for his conduct." Leidtllm, 334 NW2d at 815 (cited in
note 9).
85. See note 19 and accompanying text.
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the accuracy of the defendant's beliefs cannot be determined, level three
objectivity in the standard of reasonableness would seem appropriate for
making that factual determination. 86 If evidence of the battering relation-
ship is such that a hypothetical reasonable person would conclude that
the defendant was in danger of death or great bodily harm, then certainly
the objective prerequisites of self-defense exist. Since the answer to this
question is necessarily one of probability, any reasonable doubt should be
resolved in favor of the defendant under the principle of in dubio pro reo.
It is understandable that some courts err in selecting the appropriate
level of objectivity in the reasonableness standard. If the objective re-
quirements for a self-defense justification are not clearly fulfilled, as is al-
ways the case when the victim is sleeping, then certainly this
determination must apply the objectivity inherent to level three reasona-
bleness. If these requirements are not fulfilled, but still the defendant
honestly believed in facts that would have justified her had they actually
existed, one may not discontinue the inquiry. The issue then becomes
one of the defendant's blameworthiness for her mistake. At this point it
is no longer interesting to consider what the objective reasonable man
would have thought, and in fact applying that standard at this level of the
inquiry would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now the defendant's individ-
ual abilities are at issue, because it is the defendant and not some hypo-
thetical individual whom we are blaming and punishing for the mistake.
The tendency of some courts to mix objective determinations of fact with
subjective determinations of guilt collapses these two very different ques-
tions, and thereby abrogates the duty to treat every individual justly.
Before turning to German law, it would be appropriate briefly to re-
view the arguments regarding U.S. law. If the trier of fact determines the
defendant was not in imminent danger of death or grievous bodily harm
at the time she killed her spouse, then the inquiry must continue regard-
ing her blameworthiness for making the mistake. At this point, applying
an objective standard of reasonableness fails to give due regard to factors
relevant to just punishment. Furthermore, there is the pitfall of slipping
to excessive objectivity in defining the reasonableness of a defendant's
belief that the attack is imminent. Knowledge of the entire battering rela-
tionship, and not only knowledge of the facts at the time of the defensive
action, is relevant even under an objective standard of reasonableness.
Courts that apply the subjective standard avoid both of these problems
and permit juries to reach not guilty verdicts based on a range of factors
relevant to just desert. Additionally, the imminent attack requirement
common to traditional definitions of self-defense assumes that attacker
86. Level three objectivity is relevant to making concrete factual determinations, see notes 37-49
and accompanying text.
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and defender are equally matched. This requirement is impossible to ful-
fill as an objective matter and difficult to argue with respect to the defend-
ant's actual beliefs when the batterer is asleep. This hiatus in an extreme
phase of the battering relationship, however, may be the only possible
moment for the physically inferior spouse to save herself from grievous
bodily harm or even death should the violent spouse awaken in a fit of
momentary rage and lack of self-control. A standard such as the one
adopted by the Model Penal Code, requiring that the defensive action be
imminently necessary, avoids the unjust treatment inherent to the tradi-
tional standard. The Model Penal Code standard may justify the battered
woman based on the type of objective standard of reasonableness that
gives regard to all of the defendant's knowledge at the time of the defen-
sive action.
Admittedly, problems exist with the self-defense justification in bat-
tered women cases. The remainder of this article considers German legal
theory to justify the battered woman's defensive response under a theory
of necessity rather than self-defense. I first will provide some background
information on why the German courts have turned to necessity rather
than self-defense in battering cases.8 7 I then will consider two types of
necessity justifications, aggressive and defensive necessity, as they have
been developed in the scholarly literature and applied to cases in which
the requirements of self-defense are not fulfilled.88 Defensive necessity is
an ideal justificatory defense for the battered woman.89 Although all of
the concepts required for a defensive necessity approach are inherent to
the common law, I also will provide model codifications for this defense
and the complementary defense of aggressive necessity.
I
III. GERMAN THEORY
A. Development of the Necessity Defense Approach
German courts have taken a different route from U.S. courts in pro-
viding the battered woman with a defense to a criminal charge. Whereas
U.S. courts have tended toward acquittal based on some version of self-
defense or toward punishment mitigation based on heat of passion, Ger-
man courts have been more favorable to the defense of necessity in bat-
tered woman cases. Self-defense is problematic in these cases, since
usually the victim is not attacking at the moment the defendant acts.90 In
many U.S. jurisdictions a prerequisite of perfect self-defense is the victim's
87. See notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
88. See notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
89. See notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
90. See notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
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reasonable belief that he is being attacked. Under German law, self-de-
fense is the response to a "present, wrongful attack." 91 Rather than ex-
pand upon the concept of an "attack" to include a general danger of a
future attack, the courts have viewed the situation created by the victim
as an "ongoing danger" 92 that the defendant can repel even in cases in
which the victim's life is at stake. This Part examines the development of
German law and legal theory on this issue and considers whether it can
provide some insight for U.S. courts in battered woman cases.
In a 1926 case, the Reichsgericht 93 affirmed the decision of a lower
court in acquitting94 the defendant for killing his father in a battering
case. In that case, the defendant's mother had a serious heart condition
and the family doctor had warned the defendant that extreme emotional
upheaval could result in either the mother's having a stroke or commit-
ting suicide. Twenty hours before the defendant's act, his father had seri-
ously mistreated the defendant's mother and sister and shortly before had
threatened to repeat the mistreatment of the day before, "but twice as
bad."9 5 The defendant shot and killed his father while he was still in bed
playing with the family dog.
At the time of this case neither the Strafgesetzbuch nor the courts
clearly distinguished between necessity as a justification and as an excuse,
although the distinction was not foreign to the German literature.96 The
court considered three possible defenses provided for in the old version of
the Strafgesetzbuch:
(Duress):
A punishable act does not exist if the actor was coerced to commit the
act through irresistible force or through a threat that involved a present
and otherwise unavoidable danger for the life or limb of the actor or of
one of his relatives.... 97
(Self-defense):
A punishable act does not exist if the act was required in self-defense.
Self-defense is the defense that is necessary to ward off a present,
wrongful attack from oneself or another. Excessive self-defense is not
91. For the definition of self-defense under German law, see note 58.
92. "Dauergefahr" in German.
93. Reichsgericht judgment of July 12, 1926 ("RG 12 July 1926"), 60 Reichsgericht in Straf-
sachen 318 (1927) ("RGSt").
94. Under German law the prosecutor in a criminal case may generally appeal an acquittal both
on the basis of factual as well as legal error. In this sense, the double jeopardy guarantee is not
provided as it is under the United States Constitution.
95. RG 12 July 1926, 60 RGSt at 320 (cited in note 93).
96. See I. von Olshausen, Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch fi" das Deutsche Reich § 54, Comment 3
at 284 (Vahlen, 1 th ed 1927) ("StGB Kommentar").
97. Strafgesetzbuch (old version) 5 52 ("Reichsstrafgesetzbuch" or "RStGB"), reprinted in 01-
shausen, StGB Kommentar at 267 (cited in note 96).
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punishable if the actor exceeded the limits of defensive action in a state
of consternation, fear or fright.98
(Necessity):
A punishable act does not exist if the act, in a case other than self-
defense, was committed during a state of necessity for which the actor
was not responsible and which could not have been avoided otherwise
and in order to save the life or limb of the actor or one of his relatives
from a present danger.99
The court rejected duress since it required that the defendant be co-
erced by another individual through a threat or through force to commit
a criminal act and that the coercion be exerted at the time of the act. It
also rejected self-defense because it required that the defendant be re-
sponding to an immediate attack by the victim. The court referred to
both of these defenses as requiring "dangers of the moment,"1°° as op-
posed to necessity which also included "situations of longer duration."10 1
On appeal, the prosecutor had argued that necessity was inapplicable,
since it required dangers caused by natural events.10 2 The court explicitly
rejected this argument: "[Tihe dangerous state-be it of a momentary or
lasting nature-can have its basis in the blameworthy . . .conduct of
humans, indeed in their generally existing dangerousness for those
around them."' 0 3
Another issue raised on appeal was that the danger presented by the
victim was not imminent, since the last harm had occurred twenty hours
before the defendant's act, and at the time of the act the victim was lying
in bed. This question is of considerable relevance in battering cases be-
cause usually the victim is physically stronger than the defendant. If so,
98. RStGB S 53, reprinted in Olshausen, StGB Kommentar at 275 (cited in note 97).
99. RStGB S 54, reprinted in Olshausen, StGB Kommentar at 284 (cited in note 97). All three of
these sections merely stated that the defendant was "not punishable" ("unstrafbar") if the defense
applied to the case, but at that time the scholarly literature and the courts clearly viewed self-defense
as a justification and duress as an excuse although they were divided on the issue regarding necessity.
In 1927 the Reichsgericht introduced the defense of "extra-statutory justified necessity" thus settling
the question. The modem Strafgesetzbuch includes both duress and necessity as excuses (S 35) and
as justifications (S 34) depending on whether the value saved is of essentially more value than the
value sacrificed, self-defense as a justification (S 32), and excessive self-defense as an excuse (S 33).
100. "Exactly herein lies the essential difference between the danger inherent to a state of neces-
sity and the dangeis inherent to the moment as covered by RStGB SS 52 and 53 (cited in note 97).
The concept of "state of necessity," as its name implies, includes both situations of longer duration as
well as those of the passing moment. RG 12 July 1926, 60 RGSt at 321 (cited in note 93). The
German word "Notstand" literally means "necessity state" and of course lends itself better to the
analysis given it here by the court than its simple translation "necessity" (as a defense to a criminal
charge) in English.
101. Id.
102. See Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses S 27(b) at 108 (cited in note 9), for a discussion and
rejection of the distinction between duress and necessity as one of humanly, as opposed to naturally,
caused danger.
103. RG 12 July 1926, 60 RGSt at 319 (cited in note 93).
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waiting for the next attack means sacrificing all possibility of self-defense.
The court dismissed this argument, saying that the imminence of the dan-
ger is neither to be judged by the initiation of the actual attack nor di-
rectly prior to it, but rather in light of an ongoing danger that could erupt
at any time and that then could no longer be avoided.10 4
Today the Strafgesetzbuch provides a justification for otherwise
wrongful acts undertaken in a state of necessity.105 The justification ap-
plies if the interest saved substantially outweighs the interest harmed, and
the threat to the interest saved was otherwise unavoidable. The code also
provides an excuse for individuals who have saved their own interests in a
necessity situation, or those of a relative or close friend, regardless of the
comparative value of the interests involved. 10 6 In addition, a new justifi-
catory defense for criminal acts, referred to as "defensive necessity," has
found its way into the leading theoretical literature on criminal law. It is
this defense that offers a possible alternative to self-defense in battering
cases. Although it is codified in the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch,10 7 the
scholarly literature has discussed extensively its applicability in the crimi-
nal law.108 To understand the real nature of the interrelationship be-
tween a traditional lesser evils defense, referred to as "aggressive"
necessity, and the German variation embodied in "defensive" necessity, it
is necessary to examine the relevant codifications.
B. Aggressive and Defensive Necessity
The German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch includes two sections on ne-
cessity. Section 904, corresponding to the traditional lesser evils defense
in the criminal law, reads as follows:
(Necessity) The owner of property is not justified in prohibiting an-
other person from interfering with that property if that interference is
necessary to avoid a present danger and the harm avoided thereby is
disproportionately large in relation to the damage suffered by the
owner of the property. The owner can demand restitution for the dam-
age suffered. 109
104. Id at 320-21.
105. StGB S 34 (cited in note 45).
106. StGB S 35 (cited in note 45). Although the relative value of the interests is not a factor
considered under S 35, only certain interests, namely life, limb or personal freedom, can be saved for
the actor to be excused under this section.
107. See Birgerliches Gesetzbuch ("BGB") S 228.
108. See Joachim Hruschka, Strafrecht nach logisch-analytischer Methode 68-91, 100-17, 131-48 (de
Gruyter, 2d ed 1988) ("Strafrecht"); Ortrun Lampe, Defensiver und aggressiver Zergesetzlicher Notstand,
21 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 88 (1968) ("NJW"); Claus Roxin, Der durch Menschen ausgeldte
Defensivnorstand ("Defensivnotstand"), in Theo Vogler, ed, Festschrift fP" Hans-Heinrich jescheck zum 70.
Geburtstag 457 (Duncker & Humblot, 1985).
109. See BGB S 904 (cited in note 107):
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Although this section defines the situation in which the property
owner is not justified, the German courts interpret it as a justification for
the party causing the damage. The duty to restore the owner to his or her
original position or, under U.S. tort principles, to pay damages does not
undercut the justification but rather is the Vincent v. Lake Erie Transporta.
tion Co. 110 addition to the decision in Ploof v. Putnam. I1
The § 904 defense is an "aggressive" necessity defense, since it justi-
fies damaging the interest of an uninvolved third party to save one's own
interest. The paradigm case is Ploof v. Putnam.'1 2 In order to save a ship
from destruction in a sudden storm, the plaintiff attempted to moor the
ship at the defendant's dock. The danger threatening the ship was not
caused by the defendant nor did it emanate from the defendant's property
but rather from natural causes. Still the court held that the plaintiff had a
right to moor the ship and damage or destroy the defendant's dock, just
as 5 904 of the German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch provides a justification
for an individual to damage someone else's property even though that
property is not causing the threatened danger.
The complementary defense is contained in S 228 of the Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch:
(Necessity) One who damages or destroys another's property in order to
avert a danger emanating from it to oneself or another does not act
wrongfully if the damage or destruction is necessary to avoid the danger
and is not disproportionate thereto. If the actor is responsible for the
danger, he is liable for the damages. 113
The S 228 defense refers to "defensive" necessity. This justification
permits one to damage another's property in cases in which the danger is
(Notstand) Der Eigentiimer einer Sache ist nicht berechtigt, die Einwirkung eines anderen
auf die Sache zu verbieten, wenn die Einwirkung zur Abwendung einer gegenw~rtigen
Gefahr notwendig und der drohende Schaden gegenilber dem aus der Einwirkung dem
Eigentiimer entstehenden Schaden unverhaltnismaoig groo ist. Der Eigentiimer kann Er-
satz des ihm entstehenden Schadens verlangen.
The "restitution" available under U.S. law would be money damages, whereas the primary remedy
available under German law is "natural restitution." This distinction relates to the difference be-
tween German and U.S. remedies and is irrelevant to the present discussion.
110. Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co, 109 Minn 456, 124 NW 221 (1910).
111. Ploof v Putnam, 81 Vt 471, 71 A 188 (1908).
112. In Ploof, the court held that the defendant, whose servant released the plaintiff's ship from
its moorings from the defendant's dock during a violent storm to avoid damage to the dock, was liable
in tort for the loss of the ship. Id. In Vincent, the court held that the defendant who moored his ship
at the plaintiff's dock was liable in tort for the damage to the dock. (cited in note 110). Vincent does
not undercut the justification provided in Ploof, but rather requires the party whose interest is being
saved at the cost of the other party's interest to pay for the damage caused.
113. See BGB S 228 (cited in note 107):
(Notstand) Wer eine fremde Sache besch~digt oder zerst rt, um eine durch sie drohende
Gefahr von sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden, handelt nicht widerrechtlich, wenn die
Besch~digung oder die Zerst6rung zur Abwendung der Gefahr erforderlich ist und der
Schaden nicht auper Verhaltnis zu der Gefahr steht. Hat der Handelnde die Gefahr ver-
schuldet, so ist er zum Schadensersatze verpflichtet.
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caused by that property. If the Ploof v. Putnam facts were altered such that
the ship were a mere boat that was already docked at defendant's wharf
when a sudden storm arose, and the boat was causing damage to the
dock, the defendant would be justified under defensive necessity in releas-
ing the boat from its moorings and thereby destroying it to avert damage
to the dock. Although one might see this defense as a version of self-
defense (defense of property) rather than necessity, such an interpretation
would be fallacious. The primary difference between the two defenses" 14
is that self-defense is triggered by a present attack whereas defensive ne-
cessity is triggered by an imminent danger.
A closer look at aggressive and defensive necessity also reveals the
complementary nature of the standards employed for balancing the inter-
ests involved. In cases of aggressive necessity, the actor may justifiably
damage the property of an uninvolved third party only in cases in which
the interest thereby saved is of disproportionately greater value than the
interest damaged. In cases of defensive necessity, the actor is justified in
damaging the danger-causing property in all cases except when the value
of that property is disproportionately high in comparison to the value of
the property saved. Thus in the case of Ploof v. Putnam, the ship owner
may damage or destroy the dock to save the ship under an aggressive
necessity theory in cases in which the ship is of much greater value than
the dock, whereas the dock owner may damage or destroy the boat to save
the dock under a defensive necessity theory in cases in which the boat is
not of much greater value.
C. Application of the Defensive Necessity Defense
Because of the theoretical advantages in distinguishing between cases
of aggressive and defensive necessity, this distinction has become part of
the leading theory in Germany." 5 Part IV argues that it provides an ideal
justification for the battered woman.
1. Fleeing Aggressors. Generally, self-defense is limited to warding
off an attack. Once the attack has stopped, the right to exercise self-
defense no longer exists. 16 Any after-the-fact "defense" is viewed as pos-
114. The BGB in fact provides separate defenses for self-defense (S 227) and defense of property
(S 228). Id.
115. See Hruschka, Strafrechtt at 100-17, 131-48 (cited in note 108); Lampe, 21 NJW at 88-93
(cited in note 108) (both deriving the defense directly from BGB 5 228). But see Karl Lackner,
Strafgesetzbuch mit Erld'uterungen 5 34 at 217-18 (Beck, 18th ed 1989) ("StGB Erlduterungen"); Roxin,
Defensivnotstand (cited in note 108); Sch6nke and Schr~der, Kommentar 5 34 at 504-05 (cited in note
81) (all employing the criminal law provision on aggressive necessity but altering the balancing test
provided in that section for cases of defensive necessity).
116. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law at 395 (cited in note 18).
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sible revenge on the part of the original victim. One recognized excep-
tion to this rule concerns the thief trying to escape with the goods he has
just stolen. Under U.S. law, the victim may be justified in exercising
something short of deadly force to hinder the escape and thereby defend
his property. The relevant attack, however, is characterized as "unlaw-
fully carrying away" the defender's property and is, therefore, even
though the thief is fleeing, imminent. 117 Under German law, the problem
is solved by distinguishing between "consummated" and "completed" at-
tacks.'18 Although for the purposes of the escaping thief's criminal liabil-
ity, theft is consummated at the time of the taking, 1 9 for the purposes of
the self-defense or defense of property justification, the attack has not as
yet been completed and, therefore, is still in progress.
An interesting twist to this problem, and one that could not be
solved through analogy to the escaping thief situation, was presented by a
1979 case considered by the Bundesgerichtshof. 120 The attack in that
case came from an intruder into a family dwelling at night. The victims of
the intrusion were awakened on several occasions to find the violator
standing silently in their bedroom. On several other occasions, the intru-
sion was hindered in the middle of the night by the sounding of an alarm
system that was installed to detect the invader. Since these invasions oc-
curred over some period of time, the residents became more and more
wary of leaving the house at night for fear that the intruder could present
a real threat to their children. Although they had reported the problem
to the police, they too had been unsuccessful in apprehending the in-
vader. On the final occasion, the intruder again was discovered in the
middle of the night silently standing in the bedroom. The defendant im-
mediately arose, loaded a gun from his night table and chased after the
intruder. The intruder escaped the house and was running down the
street when the defendant, after making several demands that the in-
truder stop or he would shoot, shot the intruder.
The lower court found the defendant, guilty of aggravated battery
and appeal was taken to the Bundesgerichtshof. The German High
Court, although admitting that a great deal could be said for necessity as a
justification, held that the issue was not worthy of consideration because
117. See Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses S 134 at 107 (cited in note 18); LaFave and Scott,
Criminal Law at 399-400, 402 (cited in note 18).
118. See Sch6nke and Schr6der, Kommentar S 32 at 470 (cited in note 81); Giinter Stratenwerth,
Strafrechr, Ailgemeiner Ted 1 135, 189 (Heymanns, 3d ed 1981).
119. If theft were not consummated at the time of the taking, then a successful defense of the
property by stopping the escaping thief would mean that he could be charged only with the attempted
offense.
120. Bundesgerichtshofjudgment of May 15, 1979 ("BGH 15 May 1979"), 32 NJW 2053 (1979);
Joachim Hruschka, Rechrfertigung oder Entschuldigung im Defensivnotstand?, 33 NJW 21 (1980).
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the defendant was excused, and therefore not punishable, under a theory
of necessity as an excuse.12' This decision is somewhat surprising for a
legal system that clearly distinguishes justifications from excuses. The
court recognized that self-defense was not applicable to the case, since
under any interpretation the attack had ceased, and the attacker was flee-
ing. The court, however, considered only aggressive and not defensive
necessity as a possible justification.
Considering the problems inherent in applying aggressive necessity
to the facts of that case one can understand the decision somewhat better.
The interests involved are the intruder's right to physical integrity versus
the defendant's family's right to privacy. Clearly an invasion of one's
right to privacy does not represent harm to an interest of much greater
value than the interest of the intruder in his physical well-being. For this
reason alone, aggressive necessity would be unavailable as a justification
for the defendant's conduct. Defensive necessity, on the other hand, does
not require that the right to privacy being protected greatly outweigh the
right to physical integrity being harmed, but that the right to physical
integrity not greatly outweigh the right to privacy. That the danger
source should bear the greater burden of possible damage when it con-
flicts with an interest it is endangering is intuitively appealing from a
moral standpoint, particularly in the type of case when the danger is
caused intentionally.
Although the German High Court ruled out self-defense because the
intruder was fleeing rather than attacking, and did not consider defensive
rather than aggressive necessity, it did excuse the defendant on a necessity
theory. The court thereby affirmed that even though there was no pres-
ent attack, the intruder presented an imminent danger. An imminent
danger can exist over an extended period of time, thereby including a
situation of longer duration rather than only a momentary threat.'22
2. Abortion. Although in the United States a woman's right to
obtain an abortion has been based on her constitutionally protected right
to privacy,1z3 German courts have struggled with the problem within the
121. BGH 15 May 1979, 32 NJW at 2053-54 (cited in note 120); see also Hruschka, 33 NJW at 21
(cited in note 120).
122. In its interpretation of "imminent danger", the Bundesgerichtshof followed RG 12 July 1926
(cited in note 93) in the battered woman case, see text cited in notes 93-104. This interpretation is
generally accepted in Germany today. Lackner, StGB Erldutemngen S 34 at 214 (cited in note 115),
defining the danger as "an unusual situation, which according to normal experience can change at
any time as a result of its natural development and cause damage, or when the occurrence of damage
is certain or highly probable if defensive measures are not soon employed; Sch6nke and Schr6der,
Kommentar at 498-99 (cited in note 81), stating the requirement that "the danger threatening situa-
tion of longer duration can at any time, that is soon, result in damage."
123. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
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confines of the criminal law. In fact, the first judicial recognition of neces-
sity as an extra-statutory ground for justification was made by the Reich-
sgericht in a 1927 abortion case.124 At the time that case was decided
only one provision on necessity was contained in the Reichsst-
rafgesetzbuch, 125 and the courts did not always carefully distinguish be-
tween cases of justification and excuse under that provision. 126 The
provision itself was not clear, since it merely said that "a punishable act
does not exist" in necessity situations without specifying whether the act
was not punishable because it was justified or because it was excused. The
Reichsgericht had recognized that an act in necessity could be justified
and that justification depended upon whether the higher-valued interest
was saved as early as 1892.127 Since the 1892 case involved an attack on
property rather than on personal interests such as life and limb, it did not
provide the last word on the issue for the abortion decision.
In the abortion case, the court indicated that before the Reichsst-
rafgesetzbuch 128 had been enacted, German scholars justified the doctor
in performing an abortion to save the life or health of the mother under a
theory of defensive necessity since the danger was emanating from the
interest damaged. 29  Since the subsequently adopted Reichsst-
rafgesetzbuch only excluded punishment without specifying whether the
exclusion was based on a justification or an excuse, and since it provided
the exclusion only to the person endangered and his or her relatives, Ger-
man scholars no longer knew how to treat the doctor, who was neither in
danger nor protecting his family members from any danger by performing
124. Reichsgericht judgment of March 11, 1927 ("RG 11 March 1927"), 61 RGSt 242 (1928).
125. RStGB S 54 (cited in note 97).
126. See note 96 and accompanying text.
127. Reichsgericht judgment of May 5, 1892 ("RG 5 May 1892"), 23 RGSt 116 (1893). This case
is interesting in itself, if for no other reason than to realize how important the justification-excuse
distinction has been under German law. The defendant here was a bar owner, who when a brawl
broke out in his bar tried to prevent certain patrons from using his beer mugs to protect themselves.
Since these patrons were the ones initially attacked by other bar guests, they were defending them-
selves and justified in relation to their attackers under a theory of self-defense. Since the bar owner,
however, was not one of the original attackers, they were not thereby justified in relation to him. The
court pointed out that they would be justified under a theory of necessity if the interest they were
saving was of essentially greater value than the interest sacrificed. If they were justified in damaging
the beer mugs then the bar owner could not be justified in preventing them from doing so (that is, the
"incompatibility thesis," see note 36). If they were only excused in damaging the beer mugs, the bar
owner could be justified in preventing them from doing so. The court stated that the interests to be
balanced were the lives of the patrons versus the value of the mugs and since the former interest was
clearly of much greater value, the patrons were justified under the defense of necessity in relation to
the bar owner.
128. The Reichsstrafgesetzbuch came into effect in 1876.
129. RG 11 March 1927, 61 RGSt at 248 (citing BGB S 228 on defensive necessity) (cited in note
124).
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the abortion. 130 The court held that the doctor was justified because loss
of the mother's life, as a life in being, or significant damage to the
mother's health was a greater loss than the loss of the life of the fetus.
The court adopted the standard appropriate for aggressive necessity, but
explicitly stated that its holding was in line with the interpretation of
abortion as defensive necessity.1 31
Defensive necessity as a justification for abortion is conceptually
more satisfying than aggressive necessity or lesser evils. Under aggressive
necessity the interest sacrificed must be of less value than the interest
saved. In order to justify taking the life of the fetus to save the life of the
mother, one must discount one life to tip the scales in favor of the other.
To justify saving the mother's health, the life of the fetus must be dis-
counted even more. No doubt the current U.S. abortion law permits dis-
counting the life of the fetus. What the future state of the law will be in
the United States in light of impending challenges to Roe v. Wade 132 re-
mains to be seen.1 33 The issue of whether the fetus is or is not a human
life loses relevance if defensive necessity is considered the appropriate de-
fense in these cases. Since the danger emanates from the fetus, the only
issue would be whether the fetus's interests are greater, or under the Ger-
man standard disproportionately greater, than the mother's interests.
Even without discounting the life of the fetus one may say that one per-
son's interest in life is not greater than another person's interest, and one
person's interest in life is not disproportionately greater than another's
interest in heakh. 134
3. Preemptive Attacks. Another problem with applying a tradi-
tional self-defense justification to some threatening situations appears
when the victim must attack preemptively in order to defend himself.
130. That the mother was not punishable was clear even under the then existing necessity provi-
sion of RStGB S 54. But if the mother were justified, then anyone could assist her in warding off the
danger. If she were merely excused, then only she and her relatives could be excused, but not a third
party who was not personally affected by the danger.
131. RG 11 March 1927, 61 RGSt at 248 (cited in note 124).
132. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (cited in note 123).
133. In West Germany before unification, abortion was generally prohibited, see StGB S 218
(cited in note 45). However, StGB S 218a includes exceptions for cases of prenatal deformation and
for cases in which the mother was the victim of a sexual offense or in cases of danger for the life or
physical or emotional health of the mother. In East Germany, abortion during the first twelve weeks
of the pregnancy was generally permitted, see StGB (E Ger) S 153, Gesetzblatt (GBI) I, No 5, 89
(1972), GBI II, No 12, 149 (1972). According to the Unification Treaty, the prohibition against
abortion under German law does not apply to the area of former East Germany; see Einigungsvertrag,
Anlage I, Kapitel III, Abschnitt I, No 1.
134. Today's Strafgesetzbuch, see StGB 5 218a (cited in note 45), essentially incorporates the
defensive necessity standard for the first trimester of pregnancy; see Hruschka, Strafrecht at 168-69
(cited in note 108); see also Lampe, 21 NJW at 90-91 (cited in note 108).
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The Model Penal Code definition of self-defense 35 anticipates this prob-
lem,136 and requires only that the actor believe that the force is immedi-
ately necessary to protect himself on the present occasion. Similarly, the
Code also omits the imminence requirement for the defense of lesser
evils. 137 In Germany, and under the common law and the existing law of
many United States jurisdictions, however, the attack which triggers self-
defense must be present. Any preemptive attack used as a defensive mea-
sure would thereby be excluded from the self-defense justification.
In 1959 the Bundesgerichtshof reversed a conviction for false impris-
onment in a case concerning a preemptive attack as a defensive mea-
sure. 138 In that case the mother of one of the defendants suffered from
paranoic schizophrenia. During her sporadic attacks, she believed that
she was being threatened by devils and even feared that she would be
poisoned by her daughter. To avoid this imagined danger she poured
holy water throughout her room until the floor of the room was com-
pletely soaked and often fled half-undressed from the common dwelling to
seek help at a children's home. In response, the defendants began locking
her in her room when the first symptoms of one of her periodic attacks
became noticeable. The lower court convicted the two defendants of false
imprisonment and the appeal was taken to the Bundesgerichtshof.
Viewed under a theory of aggressive necessity, false imprisonment
cannot be justified in this case. The interests to be balanced are the
mother's personal freedom to move about as she pleases against her
daughter's and her husband's property interest that was damaged by the
water the victim poured on the floor. In addition, self-defense or defense
of property cannot justify the defendants' actions, since the defensive
measure was employed preemptively before the victim began to cause any
property damage. The German High Court still reversed the conviction.
135. MPC S 3.04(1) (cited in note 19).
136. "Nor does the draft limit the privilege of using defensive force to cases where the danger of
unlawful violence is 'imminent,' as many formulations of the rule now do.... There would, for
example, be a privilege to use defensive force to prevent an assailant from going to summon reinforce-
ments, given belief and reason to believe that it is necessary to disable him to prevent an attack by
overwhelming numbers-so long as the attack is apprehended on the 'present occasion'." MPC
S 3.04, (Comments Tent Draft No 8, Art 3, 1958).
137. MPC S 3.02 (cited in note 19). See also Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality at
291-92 (Oxford Press, 1987): "Section 3.02 does not include a requirement found in many formula-
tions that the evil to be avoided must be imminent.... If Vicki, sharing a two-week vacation with
Fred at a remote mountain cabin, learns that Fred plans to kill her in six days, she may take Fred's car
now if that promises to be the only way to escape safely. Although the evil is not imminent, taking
the car is a necessary last resort for Vicki and should be privileged."
138. Bundesgerichtshof judgment of June 16, 1959, 13 BOHSt 197 (1960).
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The scholarly literature explains this case in terms of defensive neces-
sity.139 Under a theory of defensive as opposed to aggressive necessity,
the defendant's interest must not greatly outweigh that of the victim for
the defendant to be justified in causing the victim harm. Instead the de-
fensive measure is justified if it does not harm an interest of much greater
value than it saves. In the case under consideration, it is not true that the
victim's interest in freedom of movement while suffering from her spo-
radic attacks is of considerably greater value than the defendants' interest
in avoiding permanent damage to their property through continued inun-
dation. Since the victim was the source of the danger, the defensive ac-
tion would be justified. Under a theory of defensive necessity as opposed
to self-defense, the danger to the defendant need not proceed from a pres-
ent attack. Instead the victim must be the source of imminent danger to
the defendant. A situation of imminent danger can be ongoing and the
defense thereby available at the time necessary to avoid the threatened
harm. Accordingly, preemptive attacks, if necessary to avoid future harm,
are justified. In the present case the defendants were familiar with the
victim's cycle of schizophrenic attacks during which she presented a real
danger to them. Rather than require the defendants to wait until the
damage is in progress, as would be necessary under a theory of self-de-
fense, defensive necessity permits preemptive action to avoid certain fu-
ture harm.
These are but a few of the cases in which a theory of defensive neces-
sity provides a consistent solution to problems that cannot be solved ade-
quately through either aggressive necessity or self-defense. As a
justification it is applicable in any case in which an imminent danger
threatens legally protected interests. The danger does not have to be
present as does an attack for the self-defense justification, but rather can
be ongoing or intermittent. The defense justified thereby can be exer-
cised peremptorily or at any time necessary to discontinue the danger
threatened. Since the danger is emanating from the victim, the balancing
tests inherent to the lesser evils or aggressive necessity defense is inverted,
permitting damage to interests of equal, or slightly disproportionate,
value.
IV. THE DEFENSIVE NECESSITY SOLUTION
The last part considered German legal theory to elucidate defensive
necessity as a justificatory defense in cases in which self-defense is inap-
propriate. In addition, lesser evils or aggressive necessity, although per-
139. See Hruschka, Strafrecht at 131-35 (cited in note 108); Lampe, 21 NJW at 90-91 (cited in note
108).
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haps conceptually closer than self-defense to providing a solution in these
cases, also are inappropriate because of the relative weight of the interests
involved. Although defensive necessity is complementary to the common
law lesser evils defense, it has not as yet appeared in U.S. case law nor
developed in the theoretical literature. This justificatory defense is ideally
applicable to the case in which the battered woman kills her sleeping
spouse. Since this defense compliments the common law necessity or
lesser evils defense, it applies to battered woman cases in the U.S. today
without any need for prior legislative action. For the sake of conceptual
clarity, however, two model code provisions also distinguish the require-
ments for aggressive and defensive necessity.
A. The Defensive Necessity Argument
The major problem with applying self-defense to the battered woman
case in which the defendant killed her sleeping spouse is that traditionally
self-defense is the response to a present wrongful attack. Including the
killing of an aggressor while he is sleeping within self-defense thereby ex-
tends the justification far beyond its conceptual origin. However, some
cases exist in which the battered wife's response seems every bit as justi-
fied as the response of one acting in self-defense. The fact that U.S.
courts are prepared to consider self-defense as a justification for the killing
indicates a willingness to justify the battered woman that is perhaps com-
pletely appropriate but conceptually unclear. Rather than base the de-
fense on the objective existence of an attack, the courts must rely upon
the defendant's beliefs in the necessity of using defensive force. In deter-
mining whether those beliefs are reasonable, a subjective standard must
be applied in the total absence of any attack. Although the subjective
standard of reasonableness is completely appropriate for determining the
defendant's blameworthiness for making a mistake as to the necessity of
using defensive force, it is not a substitute for determining whether the
objective elements of a justification are fulfilled in the particular case. For
this reason alone, many courts may be unwilling to apply the subjective
standard.
The necessity or lesser evils defense generally requires not a present
attack but a situation of imminent danger. It is exactly this distinction
that separates the battered woman case from the typical self-defense
case.14° Even though it is very difficult to maintain that the defendant in
these cases was being attacked, the fact that her spouse has placed her in a
general situation of danger is more plausible. A dangerous situation can
140. See Graff, 10 Loyola LA Intl & Comp LJ at 14-17, 21 (cited in note 17) for a discussion of
the problem with extending the self-defense justification to include non-attacking husbands.
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be ongoing and need not represent a sudden threat posed by another's
voluntary, aggressive conduct. If the spouse's slumber is merely a momen-
tary pause in a battering relationship that threatens great bodily harm or
death, then an imminent danger, though not a present attack, can exist
objectively. Courts, therefore, do not have to rely on purely subjective
evaluations in affirming the dangerous situation. The first step in a bat-
tered woman case should be to show a situation of necessity rather than
self-defense.
The traditional necessity situation is one in which there is an immi-
nent danger that can be avoided only through harming another
uninvolved individual's interests. Taking someone else's car to drive an
accident victim to the hospital or breaking into someone's cabin to gain
shelter from a blizzard are typical examples of the type of case in which
the defense is appropriate. In these cases the danger emanates from some
extraneous source and the rights of an uninvolved third party are violated
to save one's own or someone else's interests. Since the defensive mea-
sure is essentially an attack on a third party's interests, German literature
refers to it as "aggressive" necessity. A violation in aggressive necessity is
justified only if an interest of more, or considerably more,141 value is
saved than harmed. Therefore, one cannot take another person's car to
get to a business appointment on time or break into another person's
cabin to relax from a strenuous hike. In battering cases, if the woman's
life is in danger and she can avoid the danger by doing something less
harmful than killing her husband, such as fettering him for several hours,
then she would be justified under a theory of aggressive necessity in taking
the lesser measure. If the only possibility of avoiding a future, threatened
attack on her life is to kill her husband, however, then she could not be
justified under aggressive necessity since the two values, her life versus his,
are equal.
However, defensive necessity turns the balancing test around in cases
in which the danger emanates not from some extraneous source, but
rather from the individual who is harmed by the defensive action.142 The
fact that the individual harmed causes the danger provides a sound reason
for inverting the interest balancing test, particularly in cases in which the
danger is intentional. Thus although one may not take another person's
car to avoid being late for a business appointment, if the car owner has
intentionally kept the other person from being on time, perhaps to secure
the advantages of the business deal for himself, then the defensive action
seems more reasonable. If the cabin owner has immobilized the hiker's
141. The German standard of "considerably" or "much" more value permits greater differentia-
tion in discussing the relative interests involved and, therefore, will be used in the analysis.
142. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
Vol. 1991:169
208 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 1991:169
only means of transportation, perhaps in the hopes that he will be injured
leaving the mountainous area after dark, then breaking into the cabin
to rest before continuing the journey the next day is also more
understandable.
In the battered woman cases, clearly a danger emanates from the bat-
terer. He has created a general situation of danger that, upon his awaken-
ing, can result in serious bodily harm or death for his spouse. In addition,
the danger created for the woman is a product of her husband's voluntary
actions. In such cases, the battered woman should be justified under a
defensive necessity theory in acting before the actual attack takes place,
particularly when waiting would mean that she no longer would be able to
respond effectively. The law cannot legitimately require an individual to
risk serious injury or death at the hands of someone who is intentionally
creating the relevant ongoing danger. Under a theory of defensive neces-
sity, the test is not whether the woman's interest is greater than that of
her husband's, but rather only whether his interest is disproportionately
large in comparison to hers. In life versus life cases it is not greater, and
the battered woman would be justified in sacrificing his to avert an immi-
nent danger to hers. 143
One final requirement of either type of necessity defense is that the
danger be otherwise unavoidable. The U.S. law of self-defense refers to
this requirement as the retreat rule.144 Under German law, an individual
does not have to retreat before using deadly force when exercising self-
defense, but must retreat from a danger if possible before damaging an-
other person's interests in a situation of necessity. The reason for this
distinction lies in the attitude expressed by the victim, or initial aggressor,
in a self-defense case, of disrespect for the individual rights of the de-
fender. The attack not only creates a danger for the self-defender but also
represents an affront to his personal integrity. Requiring the individual
attacked to flee rather than stand up for his rights would deny this integ-
rity. In a necessity situation, however, the danger-causing party does not
express this disregard. The focus, therefore, is upon salvaging rightful
interests and minimizing losses. If retreat is possible, then both the inter-
ests of the actor and the victim can be saved. Since under U.S. law re-
treat is also required before employing deadly force in self-defense, this
distinction between the two types of defensive force defenses is irrelevant
to the instant analysis.
143. One author who accepts the justification-excuse distinction has been willing to sacrifice the
justification defense for battered women, among other reasons because the woman's interest in her
life is equal to the man's interest in his, see Graff, 10 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J at 21-22 (cited in
note 17).
144. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
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In a battered woman case, arguably the woman could have fled,
thereby avoiding the danger, rather than take her husband's life. In cases
in which she could have taken this measure, it would be appropriate to
deny her the defensive necessity justification. Retreat is necessary under
both legal systems, however, only when it can be undertaken with com-
plete safety. If the battered woman fears for the safety of her children
when left alone with the batterer or exposes herself to similar or greater
danger through fleeing, then she should not be required to retreat before
exercising defensive force. Evidence of previous attempts to flee with the
result of being followed and more brutally beaten by the batterer or of
unsuccessful efforts to obtain police intervention would indicate the exact
nature of the particular situation. Usually the battered spouse does not
turn to deadly force upon the first confrontation, has been exposed to so
many repeated beatings over years of marriage to the batterer that the
situation is characterized by its cyclic nature. Adequate evidence of the
problems with retreat, therefore, is generally available for the judge or jury
to determine as an objective matter whether it was a feasible alternative or
not. If it were not objectively possible, it still may be the case that the
battered woman, because of what is described as "learned helplessness,"
did not recognize the viability of this course of action. In such cases a
subjective standard of reasonableness should be applied to determine her
culpability for incorrectly evaluating the situation. 145
B. Model Codifications of Aggressive and Defensive Necessity
Defensive necessity is appropriate, for the same arguments that have
been given in the battered woman case, whenever in which the actor is
being wrongfully endangered, albeit not presently attacked by another in-
dividual. Although one may argue a defensive necessity theory independ-
ent of any legislative enactment, one must do so by tipping the scale
under the lesser evils defense in favor of the non-danger causing party. It
would be conceptually clearer to enact two separate, complementary de-
fenses such as the following:
Aggressive Necessity
An actor is justified in causing harm to another individual if
1) the harm is necessary to protect the actor or any other party
from imminent danger,
2) the harm avoided by the act is (considerably) greater than the
harm caused thereby, and
3) the harm avoided was not avoidable through otherwise avail-
able less harmful alternatives.
Defensive Necessity
145. See notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
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An actor is justified in causing harm to another individual if
1) the harm is necessary to protect the actor or any other party
from imminent danger unjustifiably caused by the individual harmed,
2) the harm caused by the act is not (considerably) greater than
the harm avoided thereby, and
3) the harm avoided was not avoidable through otherwise avail-
able less harmful alternatives.
The possible inclusion under (2) of the requirement that the harm
avoided through aggressive necessity be "considerably greater than" the
harm caused and that the harm caused through defensive necessity not be
"considerably greater than" the harm avoided would permit more case
differentiation than the Model Penal Code requirement of simply
"greater than." In a battered woman case it also would permit the de-
fendant to exercise deadly force to prevent grievous bodily harm. If she
were limited to not causing harm simply greater than the harm she is
avoiding through the defensive action she would only be able to exercise
deadly force in cases in which her life is in danger. Including the possibil-
ity of preventing serious bodily harm through exercising deadly force,
however, is not novel to accepted standards under the U.S. law of self-
defense, and therefore should not present any problems under the pres-
ent suggested codification.
V. CONCLUSION
Battered women in the United States are given a wide variety of
treatment under the criminal law, ranging from conviction for first degree
murder to justification in self-defense. This article has attempted to solve
some of the problems raised by the arguably unfair treatment some U.S.
courts have given the battered spouse. In particular, a subjective standard
of reasonableness should be applied to the determination of the defend-
ant's culpability for her mistaken belief in the need to exercise defensive
force. An objective standard, on the other hand, although appropriate
for determining whether an actual self-defense situation existed, is not
relevant to the issue of culpability in these, or in any other, mistake cases.
Courts using an objective standard tend to ignore important issues of
individual responsibility thereby excluding possible acquittal based on an
excuse. Sometimes they even apply an excessively objective standard that
is inappropriate for consideratidn of the self-defense justification. In addi-
tion, an argument for justifying the battered woman under a self-defense
theory has been advanced using the Model Penal Code requirement that
the defensive force be imminently necessary rather than that the actual
attack be imminent in the traditional sense. Finally, German law and
legal theory have been examined in the hopes of finding some solution to
these cases that perhaps raises less theoretical problems than the self-de-
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fense justification. Defensive, as opposed to aggressive, necessity has been
suggested as an alternative.
A legal system that imposes punishment upon individuals subjected
to the type of terrorization typical of some battering relationships, and at
the same time provides no meaningful assistance prior to the fateful
event, undercuts the respect appropriate for its criminal norms and abro-
gates its duty to protect individuals through application of these norms.
It is not surprising that Judy Norman preferred punishment to a contin-
ued existence with a man who had gravely mistreated her over the years.
It is surprising that a society feels justified in imposing punishment in that
case, because punishment could have no possible deterrent effect, because
Judy Norman does not represent a continuing threat to society, and one
cannot point to viable alternatives to her action. Is it perhaps thought
that her husband's death, which put an end to years of violent treatment,
requires vindication? I doubt that one would feel the necessity to vindi-
cate the death of the Nazi or North Korean captor of our posited prisoner
of war, Judith. I would suggest that some battered women share a similar
fate.
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